

International Studies Review



Washington College's *International Studies Review* is intended to provide opportunities for undergraduates and alumni to publish research articles that contribute to the body of knowledge in international relations and related disciplines, that provide fresh insight into the complexities of world affairs, and that introduce readers to areas of the world they themselves have not yet explored. With its inaugural issue, the Review transports readers to such places as Japan, Finland, and Kenya. It examines such topics African feminist literature, Russia's place within the World Trade Organization, the relationship between Christianity and the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa, and changes in American foreign policy since 9/11. These essays are meant to showcase the work of our students, to engage readers in meaningful dialogue, and to enrich our understanding of the world.

For future editions, the *Review* invites submissions from other schools within our Centennial Conference, in the hope that we can enhance opportunities for undergraduate research in the interdisciplinary field of international relations, and encourage promising young scholars to share their work with their peers. Submissions should be addressed to: International Studies Review, Washington College, 300 Washington Avenue, Chestertown, Maryland 21620.

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
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*For Simon M. Hultman,
who has inspired all of us to cross borders.*



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Editors' Note

The *International Studies Review* came to exist in the minds of a small group of Washington College students—Emily Getman, Andria Hayes-Birchler, Simon Hultman and John Killeen. One year ago in a minivan returning from Washington D.C., they were discussing their respective insecurities about researching and their desire to engage in serious and exacting inquiry. They determined to encourage the pursuit of individual research interests and to provide the opportunity to publish the results. The discussion that evening is at the heart of this journal's conception.

This is a journal intended to showcase the research of students and alumni of the "international" disciplines. The vision of the *Review's* creators, however, does not end there. Naturally, international political and economic matters will occupy an important position in this annual collection, but our hopes are also to establish a forum for concerns of international health, the arts, environmental studies and beyond. The *International Studies Review* extends its welcome to writers from all fields of study who have undertaken a project with international concerns at its core. If the topic has crossed national borders, it can find a home in the *IS Review*.

Our first issue of the *International Studies Review* is dedicated to one of the students riding in that college van. We hope that some of the wonder and vision of Simon Hultman can be felt through the pages of this small volume, as it was his enthusiasm and vitality which led to its fruition.

Emily S. Getman, Editor in Chief

John Killeen, Web Editor

Jennifer E. Lubkin, Design/Production Editor



A Crisis of Expectations

The Gulf wars and continuing
restraints on Japanese foreign policy

SIMON HULTMAN

The United States of America has waged two wars on the sands of Iraq. The first of these wars was in response to the invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, while the second was linked to the United States' war on terrorism. Even though more than a decade separated these two conflicts, the initial Japanese responses to these crises were analogous. In both cases Japanese lawmakers and bureaucrats wanted to offer economic aid to the United States, to assist local parties victimized by the conflict, to dispatch Air Self-Defense Forces transport planes to assist humanitarian relief efforts, and most important, to dispatch the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) for non-combat support operations for the U.S. led coalitions.¹ What was not analogous, however, was the degree of success that Japanese policymakers were able to achieve. Looking at the two Gulf Wars and the decade that separated them, we can see the exact restraints on Japanese foreign policy, how they have been loosened, and what loosened them. I propose that the strongest forces behind the apparent changes in Japanese foreign policy are related to the efforts behind the development of an international role for the

SDF, attempts to calm fears in the region, and the strengthening of Japanese political leadership throughout the 1990s.

JAPAN AND THE FIRST GULF WAR

Less than a year after the Berlin Wall fell, the first conflict of the post-Cold War era erupted from the mouth of the Persian Gulf. On August 2, 1990, Iraqi tanks crossed the border into the territories of its oil-rich neighbor, the emirate of Kuwait. The mostly defenseless capital of Kuwait, Kuwait City, was soon captured, and the triumph of the Iraqi forces sent tremors of uncertainty across an already volatile region. The sudden invasion seemed to be a bid by Hussein at regional hegemony,² and on August 5, then President George Bush imparted the stance of the United States by proclaiming that the invasion would “not stand.”³

The shockwaves caused by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait rolled across the globe and soon hit the shores of the Japanese archipelago. The Japanese state, headed by lukewarm Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki⁴, was stunned by the Iraqi invasion and its implication that the end of the Cold War did not mean an end to hostilities between nations. Japan's initial reaction to the invasion of Kuwait was decisive and strong. Japan imposed unilateral economic sanctions on Saddam Hussein's regime and participated in the economic sanctions subsequently imposed by the United Nations. This, of course, was in line with precedent. Japan had taken similar actions against comparable aggression by powers like Vietnam during the 1970s.⁵ Japan also cooperated with the United States and other industrial democracies by freezing both Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets in the country,⁶ and followed this by voting in favor of the UN resolution calling for the Iraqi military to pull out of Kuwait.

Unfortunately, from then on, there was no precedent on which to rely. The Gulf Crisis brought calls for a Japanese contribution to collective security. Precedent, as dictated by the “made in America” constitution and the “Yoshida Doctrine,” emphasized the use of dip-

lomatic and economic tools, while definitely keeping out of participation in foreign wars. U.S. demands for a Japanese human contribution presented them with a novel situation, and consequently, the Japanese response became muddled and confused.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs composed the United Nations Peace Cooperation bill in September of 1990 under the influence of such openly pro-deployment leaders as Ozawa Ichiro and Nishioka Takeo. However, the content of this bill was too much for many Japanese politicians to accept.

In addition to this, a highly wary and uncertain Japanese public was fractured in their views of how to respond to the crisis. The Japanese public was noticeably unenthusiastic about the prospects of sending the Self-Defense Forces abroad. Consequently, the Diet decided not to pass the bill at the end of the autumn 1990 session.

When the Gulf Crisis became a full-fledged war and the U.S.-led coalition began to open fire on Iraqi targets on January 17, 1991, the Japanese government was still paralyzed in its response. The Japanese initially stumbled in their attempts to provide economic assistance to the United States and its coalition, but economic aid packages moved from a paltry \$100 million to \$4 billion, and finally to an aid package of \$13 billion when the Ministry of Finance stepped in with an offer of \$9 billion.⁷ In the end, Japan provided a large monetary contribution to the Gulf War effort, even raising taxes to do so—a tax increase which cost the average Japanese citizen ten thousand yen. However, this money was largely held up and not fully dispersed until after hostilities had already ended, when by and large it was not appreciated at all.

More importantly though, the Japanese did not provide a human contribution to the war effort. While other Asia Pacific nations, such as the Republic of Korea and the Philippines, were thanked for their contributions of non-combat personnel,⁸ Japan was left off of the official Kuwaiti list denoting the allied countries it thanked for liberating its country from the Iraqi invasion. Kuwait's failure to list Japan was a sign of the displeasure a lot of the world felt about the Japanese response to the Persian Gulf Crisis, and of the criticism that was soon to come.

JAPAN AND THE SECOND GULF WAR

Now let us fast-forward a little more than a decade and a month's time from the moment Saddam Hussein launched his ill-fated invasion of Kuwait. In the early daylight hours of September 11, 2001, two hijacked airliners smash into and utterly demolish the two towers of the World Trade Center. Another hijacked plane crashes in a field in the state of Pennsylvania, while another collides into the side of the Pentagon. The disastrous scene is transmitted across the globe, and the list of casualties includes citizens from nations across the world. Soon thereafter, the United States, led by Republican President George W. Bush, declares the beginning of a new war: a War on Terrorism.

Thousands of miles away, on the other side of the globe, policy-makers in Tokyo probably felt a unanimous and altogether haunting sense of *déjà vu*⁹ stemming from their experiences ten years earlier: Not only was the president named Bush, but the United States was once again calling for a broad coalition to help wage this war. This time, however, Japan was ready. The Japanese state, led by political firebrand Koizumi Junichiro, quickly leapt into action. Within an hour of the attack, Koizumi called a meeting of the National Security Council, the first time since 1998, and went to work developing a series of responses to the incident, in which twenty four Japanese nationals lost their lives.¹⁰ A day later, Koizumi decided to furnish victims' families with \$10 million and to give the same amount of aid to assist in rescue and clean up operations in the United States.¹¹ Koizumi followed these measures with a plan to amend the Self-Defense Forces Law to permit the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to defend United States military bases in Japan against an unforeseen attack by terrorists.¹² Lastly, Koizumi ordered the dispatch of six ASDF transport aircraft to deliver relief supplies to Afghan refugees in Pakistan, and he pledged to provide emergency economic support for Pakistan and India in order to elicit their support. After announcing the government's initial response to the attacks, Koizumi categorized the

attacks as “grave challenges not only to the United States, but also to the entire democratic society.”¹³

On September 19, Koizumi announced his plan to support the United States’ plans for military action in Afghanistan, and six days later, met with President George W. Bush in the United States to vow to implement his plans as soon as possible. This surprisingly quick response was followed by something even more astonishing: on October 29, after a mere sixty-two hours of deliberation, the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law was passed. This law allowed the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to supply non-combat logistical support and supply fuel and other materials to the U.S. and its coalition. Japan’s response and support brought praise from the United States.¹⁴

This monumental measure was followed by amendments to the PKO law, Japan Coast Guard law, the SDF law, and emergency legislation on war contingencies. Then, in the spring of 2003, the War on Terror returned U.S. attention to Iraq. Iraq, a member of the notorious “Axis of Evil,” was being touted as a haven for weapons of mass destruction, and terrorism by a multitude of American political actors. The United States tried for months to garner the United Nations’ support for military action in Iraq but failed in its efforts. The United States, with a “coalition of the willing,” then decided to wage war in Iraq. If there was a sense of *déjà vu* before, the Japanese were really feeling it now.

In the face of over 80 percent public disapproval of the U.S.-led war in Iraq, Prime Minister Koizumi gave the war his backing and later pledged to dispatch the Self-Defense Forces to aid in the war effort. Needless to say, the Japanese ability to participate in collective security had grown substantially since the days of the Persian Gulf Crisis.

EXPLAINING THE DIVERGENT POLICY RESPONSE

So why were the Japanese unable to participate in collective security during the early nineties, but successful in their attempts a decade

later? In viewing the issue, we must first consider the context and situation of the times. At the time of the Persian Gulf War, Iraq was thought to have one of the largest and most formidable armed forces in the world, and it had long been supplied militarily by the United States throughout its disastrous decade long war with Iran. Casualties were expected to be numerous, which led U.S. policymakers to press for a human contribution.

In addition to this, U.S.-Japanese relations were not healthy. Japan's enduring annual trade surpluses with the United States, and the perception that it was getting a "free ride" on defense had created a large amount of animosity towards the Japanese throughout the United States of America. The lingering image of certain U.S. legislators smashing Japanese products on the grounds of the Capitol building in Washington, D.C., visually encapsulated the spirit of the times. Americans commonly pointed to unfair Japanese trade practices, while the Japanese responded with accusations of "Japan Bashing" or outright racism. The United States was still reeling from a decade of "Reaganomics" and large deficit spending, while Japan, with its seemingly endless high levels of economic growth and recurrent trade surpluses with the U.S., was seen as the world's next superpower—a literal manifestation of the common metaphor assigned to it, a rising sun.

In reality, however, things in Japan were not as great as they were hyped up to be. Japan, which just a few years before was being touted as the world's next superpower, was sluggishly trying to come to grips with the simultaneous end of three eras: the ominous ending of the *Shōwa* era with the death of Emperor Hirohito in 1989; the rapidly crumbling era of bipolar stability that had been created as a result of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union; and the impending burst of the bubble economy. These events provided unstable international and domestic landscapes and contributed to the difficulty in responding to the crisis emanating from the Persian Gulf.

In addition to this, the beginning of the 1990s and the multitude of political scandals concerning senior Liberal Democratic Party members, bureaucrats, and large companies, marked the imminent collapse of the 1955 system, which had guided Japan throughout the post-War

era. The Liberal Democratic Party, which had ruled Japan since 1955, was faced with the first signs of its imminent fall from power when it lost control of the House of Councilors of the Japanese Diet in the elections of 1989. As Yoichi Funabashi points out, "When the gulf crisis erupted, Japan was governed by its politically weakest leadership of the post-war era,"¹⁵ which played a major factor in the Japanese inability to dispatch non-combat personnel. Moreover, the prime minister at the time, Kaifu Toshiki, was politically ineffective, as he came from the smallest faction in the Liberal Democratic Party and was unable to garner widespread support. This of course points a finger at weak political leadership as a restraint on Japanese foreign policy.

Throughout the 1980s, Japan had been on a "quest of increments" to expand their role within the United Nations. With the phenomenal rise in its economic capacity, Japan longed for a role within the United Nations which would properly reflect the amount it contributed, and gradually pushed for a seat on the United Nations Security Council. However, with the failure of its ability to contribute military personnel to the Gulf War, Japan's ambitions were thrown into doubt.

Most importantly, the Japanese had not done enough to calm the fears of its citizens and its neighbors. Both the people of Japan and citizens of other Asian nations victimized by Japan during the Asia Pacific War, most notably the Peoples Republic of China and the Republic of Korea, were noticeably worried about the implications of a Japanese state that would be able to participate in military operations on an international scale once again. However throughout the 1990s, in what is commonly referred to as the "lost decade," Japan did a lot to reduce the fears of its neighbors through official apologies and non-combat dispatch of the Japanese Self-Defense forces under the United Nations.

MULTIPLE RESTRAINTS ON JAPANESE SECURITY POLICY

The Japanese failure in its response to the Persian Gulf War can be seen as the result of a myriad of restraints holding it back from participating in collective security. Japanese security policy has been restrained

and pressured from all directions. First and foremost, the Japanese are restrained historically. There are deep and widespread domestic and international fears of resurgent militarism in Japan. These fears are kept alive through almost routine statements by prominent Japanese politicians glorifying the Japanese imperial past during official visits to sites like Yasukuni shrine, where Japanese soldiers since the Meiji era, including class-A war criminals, are enshrined. Secondly, the legacy of the “made in America” constitution, which prohibits the use of force as an instrument of foreign policy, restrains the Japanese ability to participate in collective security and also reinforces the deep-seated domestic pacifism found in Japan. Lastly, the historical weakness of Japanese leadership and the legacy of the 1955 system and the Yoshida Doctrine have also served to restrain Japanese attempts at a greater role in collective security.

Concerns with Japan's New Role Abroad

Policymaking is not done in a vacuum, nor is it done in a completely domestic environment. The thoughts, inhibitions, and fears of Japan's neighbors are tremendously important in the formulation of Japanese policy—particularly so in the case of policy associated with military affairs. This is easily evidenced by the Clean Government Party's (*Koumeito*) reasons for opposing the failed United Nations Peace Cooperation bill of 1990 and by the lifting of the ban on mainline peacekeeping operations.¹⁶ Japan's legacy as a colonial power and as a primary member of the Axis powers during the Second World War, continues to restrain Japanese policymaking to the present day. The nations surrounding Japan, most of which were founded by those who actively fought against Japanese (and/or Western) imperial domination, have not forgotten about Japan's past imperial ambitions.

The past is *sine qua non* to understanding politics in East Asia. In this matter, Japanese politicians often make the situation worse for themselves by persistently making comments that blatantly glorify the Japanese imperial past.¹⁷ From the People's Republic of China to Pearl Harbor, the effects of the onslaught of Japanese militarism con-

tinue to be felt on all sides of the Pacific basin. The accounts of atrocities by Japanese Imperial Army personnel are truly outrageous. The nations surrounding Japan have good reason to fear the possibility of a rearmed Japan, as the Japanese Imperial Army has been charged with the mistreatment of prisoners of war, brutal rape, sexual slavery, slave labor, cruel human experimentation, and the outright slaughter of Chinese citizens. For this reason, Japanese attempts to dispatch the Self-Defense Forces or to reform Japanese security policy have been met with opposition and suspicion.¹⁸

It is particularly important to understand Japan's historical relationships with the People's Republic of China and the two states on the Korean peninsula. It is important to understand these relationships not only because of the physical propinquity of these nations, but also because these nations, which arguably suffered the most under Japanese rule, are the principal international detractors to Japanese attempts to participate in collective security. My emphasis on the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) is in no way meant to detract from the suffering that other Asian nations experienced at the hands of the Japanese during the Asia-Pacific War. Instead this focus on the PRC and the ROK stems from the fact that Southeast Asian nations (with the notable exception of Singapore) essentially accommodated the participation of the Japanese Self Defense forces in non-combat roles in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.¹⁹

Japan and China have a long historical and cultural relationship that spans the greater part of two millennia. China gave Japan Buddhism, Confucianism, and its system of writing. In return, Japan developed a relationship of suzerainty to the Chinese empire. This more or less amicable relationship ended in the nineteenth century, when the relationship between Japan and China can be described as anything from a staunch rivalry to an open enmity.

How these two powers view each other is imperative to understanding the modern political setting of the region. Stability in the Chinese state has been a major concern for the Japanese. Weakness in the Chinese state—from the rise of the Mongols, to the carving up of

China by the imperial powers of the nineteenth century—has always been perceived as a threat to the sovereignty and safety of the Japanese state. On the other hand, the Chinese view Japan suspiciously and attempt to contain Japan so that Japan cannot rise to become a regional hegemonic power, and so that another Japanese foray into the Chinese mainland will never occur.

The relationship between Japan and Korea has also been long and precarious. The Korean peninsula has historically played the role of gateway to the Japanese archipelago. Confucianism, Buddhism, and Chinese ideograms all made their way to Japan via Korea. In addition, Korea was used as a launching board for the attempted Mongol invasions of Japan in the thirteenth century. This role of a gateway to Japan has kept Korea high on the minds of Japanese defense planners for centuries. Yamagata Aritomo, the Meiji oligarch and “father of the modern Japanese army,” ventured as far as saying that Korea was the “dagger aimed at the heart of Japan.”²⁰

Koreans (North and South) also view Japan with suspicion.²¹ This suspicion goes back to the failed invasion of China (by way of the Korean peninsula) by Hideyoshi Toyotomi in the sixteenth century. In fact, even today the one thousand won note portrays the Korean admiral who played a decisive role in turning back the Japanese hordes. To further cement the importance of the Japanese imperial past to Koreans, I offer this anecdote. While taking a comparative government East Asia class I purchased a book entitled *Understanding Korean Politics* by Soong Hoom Kil and Chung-in Moon. There was nothing in the index pertaining to the emerging economic or military ties between Japan and the Republic of Korea. The only mention of Japan in the index of this book was under “Japanese Colonial Rule,” where it was mentioned fourteen times. It is no surprise that the Koreans are amongst the vociferous opponents of any sign of Japanese remilitarization. Koreans are still bitter about their past relationship with the government in Tokyo; Koreans are especially resentful of Japanese attempts to force Koreans to adopt Japanese culture, names, and language during the colonial period. Some Koreans also hold the Japanese responsible for a political culture which allowed for the

“advent of authoritarian regimes” in Korea.²² The result has been an almost unfaltering Korean opposition throughout the postwar era to any attempts by the Japanese to amplify their political and cultural role in the region.²³ From war reparations, comfort women, and textbooks, to fishing rights and Japanese trade surpluses, the issues that maintain these suspicions are numerous.

Three issues in particular seem to elicit an anti-Japanese response from both the Chinese and the Koreans: the Japanese view of history (especially with regards to Japanese history textbooks), any activity perceived as an attempt at remilitarization, and official visits to the controversial Yasukuni shrine. As evidenced by the Chinese and Korean responses to the events of 2001—when new “offensive” textbooks were approved by the Japanese Ministry of Education in April, and newly elected Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro visited Yasukuni shrine on August 13—the issue of how the modern Japanese government relates to its imperial past is still very important.²⁴

Concerns with Japan's New Role at Home

The nations surrounding Japan are not the only ones to worry about the potential remilitarization of the Japanese state; the Japanese people themselves share this fear as well. The harsh nature of the Japanese Imperial state apparatus, where the populace was terrorized by organizations like the ‘thought police’, is still widely remembered by the Japanese. In addition, memories of the vicious American fire-bombing of cities and industrial centers, and the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have left a deep scar of anti-militarism on the Japanese societal psyche.

Japanese domestic anti-militarism is concordant with the foreign apprehension to any signs of Japanese remilitarization. Many Japanese do not have faith in the maturity and durability of the modern Japanese state, nor in its ability to control and contain a potentially redoubtable military complex. In Ian Buruma's words, the Japanese have “a residual distrust in themselves.”²⁵ This residual distrust and fear of the Japanese government's inability to control a military again

denotes a formidable domestic resistance to an expanded international security presence for the Japanese, as well as a political hazard for politicians who promote an expansion of this sort. Japanese domestic anti-militarism can be encapsulated into three essential principles: the exclusion of the armed forces from domestic policymaking; the abstinence from the use of force to settle international disputes; and the proscription of Japanese involvement in foreign wars.²⁶

Domestic anti-militarism is also maintained by cultural norms related to the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki—which, as Ian Buruma says, “to the majority of Japanese is the supreme symbol of the Pacific War.”²⁷ The importance of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as postwar cultural icons is demonstrated by the obligatory fieldtrips made to these sites by elementary and middle school children, and in the television shows and peace rallies held at Hiroshima and Nagasaki annually in August. The mushroom cloud and scenes of utter destruction have also become recurrent symbols in postwar mass media.²⁸ Although Japan is sheltered by the American nuclear umbrella, Japanese foreign policy has traditionally been rabidly anti-nuclear, and politicians who hint at the creation of an independent Japanese nuclear deterrent face intense scrutiny and criticism.

This anti-nuclear strand of Japanese domestic anti-militarism was basically institutionalized in 1967 when Prime Minister Sato delineated the Three Non-nuclear Principles. Prime Minister Sato declared that Japan would not make, possess, or bring nuclear weapons into Japan. These three non-nuclear principles were incorporated into a larger schema in which the Japanese would promote international nuclear disarmament while relying on the U.S. nuclear deterrent and advocating the peaceful use of nuclear energy.²⁹

Japanese domestic anti-militarism is perpetuated by the legacy of the immediate postwar period (1945–1960).³⁰ The most predominant and easily observable restraint on Japanese security policy reform is found in the ninth article of the Japanese constitution. The Japanese constitution, which was in fact “made in America,” affirms that “the Japanese people forever renounce war as the sovereign right of the nation,” and “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential,

will never be maintained." This article was not just another form of "victors' justice"; even though this article was introduced by the Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP), it reflected and institutionalized the widespread dissatisfaction and disillusionment with the path of militarism at that time.

This widespread dissatisfaction and disillusionment with militarism was later codified in what became known as the Yoshida Doctrine. The Yoshida Doctrine is actually a political compromise forged by Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru between leftist and rightist Japanese politicians. This doctrine espoused concentration on economic rehabilitation, a minimal military rearmament, and reliance upon the United States of America for external security.³¹ The doctrine allowed for the protection of Japanese sovereignty, while simultaneously allowing Japanese foreign policy to shift away from a continuation of the disastrous wartime policy of militarism, and to focus on national reconstruction. The Yoshida Doctrine served as the fundamental guiding principle in helping Japan rebound from the extensive devastation of the Second World War, and become the world's second largest economy.

However, the Yoshida Doctrine, which led Japan throughout the Cold War, began to lose its relevance as the Japanese economy "caught up" with (and in most cases surpassed) the West, and as the international framework of Cold War began to disintegrate. In addition to this, as mandated by the Yoshida Doctrine, the Japanese have conventionally used economic tools in order to increase their power and sway in the international community. Japan's over-reliance on economics as a tool of foreign policy, and its aversion to the use of force as a means of settling international disputes, has brought widespread (mostly Western) derision of so-called Japanese "checkbook diplomacy." This "checkbook diplomacy," however, is in line with Japanese cultural norms, and Western mockery of this so-called "kamikaze pacifism" often proves to be counterproductive.³²

All of these factors, however, did not engender an abandonment of the doctrine. Even though its relevance was eroded, its support base was not. As the Yoshida Doctrine was founded in the immedi-

ate postwar aversion to militarism, support for the Yoshida Doctrine has been buttressed by the powerful sentiments of Japanese domestic anti-militarism throughout the postwar era. Also, the past success of the Yoshida Doctrine has kept the number of its adherents high. Openly anti-Yoshida politicians, like former Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro and Ozawa Ichiro, have often been forced to mitigate and adulterate their views to accommodate the ardently pacifist sentiments of their parliamentary colleagues and constituents, or face severe political opposition and hardship.

Another problem is that, until after the Persian Gulf War, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (*Jieitai*) were never able to develop an identity which would help distinguish them from their imperial predecessors, for the Japanese public, the citizens and politicians of other Asian Nations, or themselves. The fact that the Japanese Self-Defense Forces never developed a widely accepted identity for themselves points to a lack of precedent as a restraint on the development of Japanese security policy. Until after the Persian Gulf War, Japanese Self-Defense Forces were never dispatched abroad. Even though the Japanese Self-Defense Forces were created in response to the Korean War, the Japanese never participated in any of the military activities on the peninsula. This also is true in regards to the Vietnam War, which the Japanese supported politically (and benefited economically) the war while not participating in it. This approach adheres to the aforementioned Yoshida Doctrine, which put emphasis on economics instead of security policy. The "peace constitution" and the principles of domestic anti-militarism further reinforce this point.

THE FUTURE OF JAPANESE SECURITY POLICY

Two major developing trends allowed for the more recent dispatching of the Japanese Self Defense Forces to Iraq earlier this year. The first deals with what Paul Midford calls the "demonstration effect," and the second deals with the strengthening of the power of the Prime Minister and his cabinet throughout the 1990s. In addition to these

developments, other factors have contributed to the changing security policy in Japan. The Japanese were able to participate in the War on Terror and Operation Iraqi Freedom through the development of an international role for its Self Defense Forces by participating in non-combat operations in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. The participation of the Self-Defense Forces in Peace Keeping Operations helped to alleviate regional fears of resurgent militarism in Japan, and displayed the difference between the modern Japanese armed forces and their Imperial predecessors. A myriad of legislative efforts throughout the 1990s helped to establish the strong leadership that was necessary for the rise of a political leader like Prime Minister Koizumi and for the subsequent Japanese responses to the War on Terror and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Throughout the 1990s, many articles appeared proclaiming that, without drastic change, the collapse of the Japanese state and economic system was imminent and irrefutable. However, major changes have taken place in Japan, though these changes have been cautious and piecemeal mostly due to the multitude of restraints discussed above. Change is not impossible in Japan, but change will be implemented on the terms and at the pace of the Japanese. Looking at the various domestic, international, and historical restraints still weighing down Japanese foreign policy, I propose that barring the event of a major crisis in Japan or the areas immediately surrounding it, Japan will continue on its present course of change that is basically incremental in nature. §

ENDNOTES

This article is adapted from the senior graduation thesis of Simon Hultman with minor editing by Professor Andrew Oros.

1. Paul Midford, "Japan's Response to Terror: Dispatching the SDF to the Arabian Sea," *Asian Survey* 43, no. 2 (2003): 330.

2. Stephen W. Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 16th ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2003): 272.

3. Rick Atkinson, *Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf*, (Mariner Books, 1993). Accessed online at "The Gulf War: Chronology," *Frontline*. <<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/cron/>>.

4. All Japanese names shall be written in the Japanese style with the surname preceding the given name.

5. Takashi Inoguchi, "Japan's Response to the Gulf Crisis: An Analytic Overview," *Journal of Japanese Studies* 17, no.2 (1991): 257.

6. Hook and Spanier, 273.

7. Inoguchi, 258.

8. The Republic of Korea contributed 150 medics, and the Philippines contributed 190 doctors and nurses. Yoichi Funabashi, "Japan and the New World Order," *Foreign Affairs* 70, no. 5 (Winter 1991/1992): 58.

9. Midford, 329.

10. David Leheny, "Tokyo Confronts Terror," *Policy Review* (Dec 2001/Jan 2002): 37.

11. Junichiro Koizumi, "Statement by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi at the Press Conference," 12 September 2001. <http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2001/0912kaiken_e.html>.

12. The Self-Defense Forces Law had originally only allowed the SDF to become involved after an attack had begun and it was clear that the police could not deal with the situation.

13. "Statement by Junichiro Koizumi."

14. Paul Wolfowitz, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, "The Gathering Storm: The Threat of Global Terror and Asia/Pacific Security" (address to the Asia Security Conference: The Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, 1 June 1 2002), *Vital Speeches of the Day*, 15 August 2002.

15. Funabashi, 58.

16. According to Midford, the Koumeito cited Asian opposition especially from the PRC and ROK.

17. This phenomena persists to the present day; for a good example see "As Japanese Politicians Bumble Over the Past, Roh Looks Ahead," *Asahi Shimbun*, 6 June 2003.

18. Funabashi, 63.

19. Midford.

20. Kenneth B. Pyle, *The Making of Modern Japan*, 2nd ed. (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1996): 136–37.

21. Midford points to Gallup polls conducted in Korea in January 2001. When asked how much they liked Japan, 56.9 percent of Koreans polled answered that they “dislike” or “dislike very much.” (Midford, 348). As for the suspicions of North Koreans, one can look at almost any issue of the Korean Central News Agency DPRK (<http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm>), which is ironically run from a Japanese server.

22. Soong Hoom Kil and Chung-in Moon, eds. *Understanding Korean Politics: An Introduction* (2001): 25.

23. A good example of this is the Korean ban on Japanese cultural imports, which (though slowly being ameliorated) still persists to this day.

24. One must just look at the first chapter of the Japanese Diplomatic Bluebook to see evidence of how the Chinese and Korean governments view the issue of the past. The Bluebook can be obtained at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs homepage, <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2002/chap1-e.pdf>>.

25. Ian Buruma, *The Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan* (London: Phoenix, 1994): 11.

26. Andrew Oros, “The Continuing Politics of Domestic Anti-Militarism” (unpublished manuscript, 2003): 3.

27. Buruma, 92.

28. Susan J. Napier, “Panic Sites: The Japanese Imagination of Disaster from Godzilla to Akira,” *Journal of Japanese Studies* 19, no. 2 (Summer 1993).

29. Peter J. Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military Norms in Postwar Japan* (Cornell University Press, 1996): 128.

30. Oros, 1.

31. Green.

32. Funabashi, 65.

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Roles of the Local Church Community in South Africa

Apartheid, present & future

YUKIKO OMAGARI

South Africa's emergence from the long-term hardship and turmoil of apartheid can be explained in many ways, including through the lenses of South Africa's many influential social groups. One such group has been the South African church community. Today, most of the people of South Africa identify themselves as Christians and belong to a church. In 1990, as political change was coming to a head in South Africa, 76 percent of black South Africans, 92.1 percent of whites, 86 percent of coloureds, and 13 percent of Indians called themselves Christians.¹ Whereas conspicuous attention has been paid to the church community at the national level as it played a direct, noticeable political role, local churches in black communities also contributed to dismantling the apartheid system by taking different approaches. Today, local church communities in rural areas, while keeping their basic functions unchanged, play more important roles than ever in developing rural communities from the legacy of apartheid.

Christian churches were closely tied to the national government during apartheid, both in terms of membership and how they under-

stood society. For instance, the political ideology of apartheid shaped churches' behavior over a long period of time, especially in the Afrikaner churches. Consequently, the Christian notion of an ideal society had been affected by the apartheid context.² For example, the Afrikaner churches officially supported the National Party, which introduced formal apartheid as the state's policy. The Chairperson of the Federal Council of the Dutch Reformed Church in 1949 announced,

[The aim of apartheid is not] oppression but development, growth, upliftment, more privileges and right according to one's own abilities, talent and potential...The Bible does not instruct us to have apartheid but it does not prohibit us from doing so either...³

In addition, the Dutch Reformed Church, together with the Gereformeerde Kerk van Zuid-Afrika (Reformed Church of South Africa) and Gereformeerde Kerk, endorsed the idea of "separate development." They claimed that different groups should develop in their own ways according to their special need, thus justifying economic and social inequality in the population.⁴

If it was the apartheid regime that constructed the Christian institutions' behavior at the national level, it was also the Christian movement itself that tried to reshape the behavior of its government. The significance of the country-wide church movement against apartheid was that it reversed a previous relationship between church and the apartheid society; instead of being affected by apartheid ideology like Afrikaner churches had previously been, the whole church community became a force to change the society. Eventually, this reorganized the social values of South Africans, gradually breaking their deep "racial" concepts, which had been rooted in the country's history over many centuries.

Christian church communities began to shape the society by various methods. Particularly, four approaches are worthy of mention. First, they introduced the idea of national unity, which disregarded colors of skin as a basis for segregated association. In fact, many ecumenical, multi-religious organizations were formed during apartheid.

Two such organizations were the Christian Institute of South Africa, established in 1963, and the Christian Council, which changed its name to the South African Council of Church (SACC) in 1967.⁵ After the Christian Institute was banned in 1977, the SACC became more active.⁶ When the state financed right-wing religious fundamentalists to oppress the churches' liberation activities, the National Institute of Reconciliation (NIR) was launched as a counter response in 1985. The NIR called for the release of all political prisoners, the return of exiles, and a direct talk between the apartheid regime and the oppositions.⁷ It further called for the end of apartheid and introduced the Christian idea of reconciliation into the political field for the first time in order to pursue national unity.

The second national-level approach used by the Church was to hold various ecumenical meetings based on multi-racial values. The first ecumenical conference after the introduction of institutionalized apartheid (in 1948) took place at Rosettenville in 1949 by the Christian Council of South Africa.⁸ Its theme was "the Christian Citizen in a Multi-racial Society." At this conference, all participating parties criticized apartheid and passed a resolution that opposed apartheid legislation. Among outspoken churches were ones that have many black members: Anglicans, Congregationalists, Methodists, and Roman Catholics.⁹

The political involvement of church organizations on the national level became more prominent as more ecumenical synods took place. In the same year, the SACC introduced the Kairos Document, which stated that the apartheid government was tyrannical and its rules should be resisted by civil disobedience.¹⁰ The Kairos Document influenced the Harare Declaration of 1985 adopted by different church leaders in the capital of Zimbabwe. In this document, church leaders officially gave support to the liberation movement of South Africa and called on the international community to implement comprehensive sanctions against the South African government.¹¹ As this shows, the South African church community acted not only internally but also externally, becoming an important entity to voice the democratic values of the country from the outside world.

Encouraged by the release of political prisoners, including Nelson Mandela, ecumenical church conferences began expressing their morality in the political arena more precisely than ever. The Rustenburg Conference was held in November 1991 under the leadership of Frank Chikane, the general secretary of the SACC. Among the forty participating church organizations were the Dutch Reformed Church, the Baptist Union, the Apostolic Faith Mission Church, the Evangelical Presbyterian Church in South Africa, and the Lutheran Church—none of which had neither been members of the SACC, nor fully dedicated in their cooperation with liberation theology before 1991.¹² In this conference, church leaders who had kept silent about atrocious apartheid policies confessed that they had been “bold in condemning apartheid but timid in resisting it,” allowing the state “to do our sinning for us.” The conference recommended that the government initiate specific regulations that they would like to see after the fall of apartheid. The conference stated that white elites would have to accept “affirmative acts of restitution in health care, psychological healing, education, housing, employment, economic infrastructure and especially land ownership” for the oppressed population.¹³

Further ecumenical synods that addressed necessary changes to the state’s political policy took place at Cape Town in October 1992. The Cape Town Statement addressed even broader issues than previous church gatherings, focusing on basic human rights, rights of women and youth, amnesty for political prisoners, sanctions, and cultural pluralism in the new South Africa.¹⁴ This comprehensive range of demands by the church community on the national political agenda would be well described by John W. de Gruchy, who regarded this conference as founded in theological, denominational, and most importantly, ideological concerns.¹⁵ In this sense, these ecumenical synods were *de facto* political-party assemblies.

The third approach was an institutional aspect of the Church: the giving of official support to a specific political party. The United Democratic Front (UDF) emerged with significant Christian support in 1983 when former President P.W. Botha introduced the tricameral parliament, which included coloureds and Indians in white politics

but excluded black Africans. The UDF's non-racial ideology gained wide support from Christian communities, which included the SACC, Catholic Bishop's Conference, and Institute for Contextual Theology.¹⁶ Moreover, direct talks between church institutions and South African opposition leaders took place in the late 1980s. The executives of the United Congregational Church met key members of the African National Congress in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe in 1986. This trend spread to other church communities. The Catholic bishops and Anglican and Methodist leaders met their ANC counterparts during the same period.¹⁷

Along with this anti-apartheid atmosphere that spread across national church organizations, black leadership gradually emerged, revealing the fourth approach to addressing Christian morality against apartheid. Selecting black church leaders was a symbolic way to show its resistance to apartheid. The Roman Catholic Church was the first church that appointed a black bishop, Pius Dlamani in 1954. Bishop Stephan Naidoo became an Archbishop of Cape Town in 1984, and Bishop Desmond Tutu was chosen in Metropolitan of the Anglican Province of South Africa in 1986. Tutu went on to play a crucial role in leading the anti-apartheid movement of ecumenical churches, and later in leading the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).¹⁸

Today, in the post-apartheid era, the church community continues expressing its moral concerns to the state, which is now democratic. This is evidenced in the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Committee (TRC). The TRC is widely considered a product of Christian theology, which had advocated reconciliation, amnesty, and national unity among conflicting groups throughout the anti-apartheid movement.¹⁹ The TRC played a symbolic role among South Africans who recognized the victory of Christian theology and the liberation movement by reflecting its morality in a national peace process. In fact, TRC commissioners and sub-committee members included church leaders such as Archbishop Desmond Tutu, who was appointed as the chair.²⁰

Although country-wide Christian movements have been successful in addressing moral issues and democratic propaganda, the unity of

different Christian communities sometimes faced hardship because of the state's policy to oppress what it called "radical Christian" or "liberation" theology.²¹ The Reverend Tena, the Minister of the Shaw Memorial Methodist Church at Grahamstown, explains that one of the most influential state policies that divided the anti-apartheid church community was the Bantu-Educational Bill introduced in the parliament in the early 1950's. Then Minister of Native Affairs, H.F. Verwoerd declared that

Racial relations could not improve if the "wrong" type of education was given to Africans...Above all, good racial relations could not exist when the education was given under the control of people who believed in racial equality. It was, therefore, necessary that African education should be controlled in such a way that it should be in accord with the policy of the state.²²

The bill enabled the state to withdraw subsidies from mission schools if they would not surrender to the state.²³ Consequently, churches faced a dilemma: if they followed the state to get financial assistance, their anti-apartheid principles would be undermined; if they rejected the state policy, a number of children would lose their schooling. Some mission schools preferred to receive the subsidy so as not to close the school; others chose closing the school rather than surrendering their anti-apartheid principles. Thus, the Bantu Education Act forced churches to realise the division between different denominations, though unity and collective acts as one church community were necessary to oppose the government.

Another factor made the churches' liberation efforts at the national level incomplete: churches were not effective in implementing their ethics on the ground level. Dr. Gaybaa, a former priest of the Roman Catholic Church in Cape Town, raised one example that showed that the church's moral perspective failed to influence people's minds on the individual level. He recalls that although his church announced apartheid was "evil" in the 1950s, the real integration of different racial groups in the church was far from implemented. In fact, "racial borders" in the church had already existed long before apartheid be-

came an official state policy; breaking this long-term belief/ideology system would take longer than the process to create it. Dr. Gaybba describes the reality in which the mind of segregation dominated white members of his church communities. The "segregation mentality" did not fade away easily; church members still did not "feel in-born" the idea of integration. Thus there was a gap between what church leaders declared at various ecumenical synods and how members of these churches actually responded at the ground level.

Even after the collapse of apartheid, church approaches to combating apartheid faced some obstacles because of its nature at the national level. For instance, it is inconceivable that the TRC—a national-level expression of Christian morality of reconciliation—fully completed the national unity. Because its report to the new democratic government was based only on voluntary confession by people who had been affected by apartheid, there was effective discrimination between victims who were seriously wounded and ones who were less seriously wounded.²⁴ In addition, what determined "less" and "more" wounded was unclear. Only seven hundred cases were identified as "gross human rights violations" although a previous estimated minimum was two thousand.²⁵

This fact further reveals that victims of human rights violations were not treated equally. This is against the tenet of both the TRC and the ideology of church: the national unity between different groups. Another issue is the period of time the commission drew for the requirement to receive rehabilitation and repatriation. The commission investigated gross violations of human rights from the arbitrary date of 1960 until 1994. This cut-off date set by the TRC could not enable the commission to undertake equal treatment of victims based on church's justice. Indeed, the Native Land Act was passed in 1913, which resulted in unfair, forceful land distribution—87 percent of the land to minority whites and the rest to non-whites. Had non-whites not been suffering a long time, even before 1960?

In addition, the "truth" the TRC searched for did not fully reveal itself in front of the victims of apartheid simply because many beneficiaries of apartheid did not confess the truth before the committee.

These beneficiaries include cabinet ministers whose policies generated malignant consequences to the social order, university professors who had been reluctant to open the door to black students, and political elites, such as those of the National Party.

After all, the TRC fulfilled its duty based on national political need, not religious healing for individuals. Thus, while the TRC was a symbol of the Church's ethics, it did not mean that the Church fulfilled a practical responsibility in compensating each individual victim.

Another concern that stems from the characteristics of the national-level church movement is its way of associating with the nation's politics. For instance, former theological leaders are now in the government office. Confusion arises when the principle of separation between religion and the state is in question. A secular political system is considered to be a modern democracy because humans need politics and religion in "separate" form. The Ethiopian Church has been said to possess one of the closest affiliation with politics and, as former President Nelson Mandela stated, "[the Ethiopian] political movement was to culminate in the formation of the ANC (African National Congress) in 1912."²⁶ Even the Ethiopian Church today recognises a different approach to politics and religion. The Reverend Mzileni of the Ethiopian Episcopal Church in Grahamstown describes the relation of the two by saying politics is "the basic need of all humans" and religion is a "supporting system of all humans." Thus, separate roles of politics and religion become clear: being a human first requires politics, then this political life is further enhanced by religious beliefs.

Current South African political leaders' beliefs are based on the Christian church's ethics. In fact, when they address political policies to earn people's support, they use Christian words of morality which were expressed in various religious meetings during apartheid.²⁷ Such an association between politics and religion has a potential for engendering confusion among the people; politicians claim that they share society's conscience, and so claims the church.²⁸ If politicians and churches speak the same language, they can draw a line between the

two, consistently recognising their separate roles in order to enhance their country's democracy.

Furthermore, Kisner Wolfram points out the difficulty in promoting a national level of understanding between different groups in a hegemonic society like South Africa.²⁹ He argues that South African society has been so divided by "classes, colours, memory, and history" that these classifications are still the center of South African society today and will not change easily.³⁰ On the national level, Christian churches, whether during apartheid or after, do not have the capacity to cope with this great pluralism of South Africa. Consequently, South Africa's biggest religious institution is unable to cultivate democratic values on an individual level because of its need to deal with the problem only on the "national" level. The national level liberation approach does not easily reach most apartheid victims, who reside in poor rural communities.

On the other hand, local black churches in rural areas have been capable of responding to individuals' needs. In fact, empirical study shows that church affiliation is stronger in rural areas than in urban areas.³¹ Local churches played psychological and physical roles in dismantling the apartheid system within rural black communities.

The psychological impact contained two dimensions: creation of democratic values in each individual, and group affiliation based on a collective objective. Mr. Guy Zwelinzima Toto, member of the Shaw Memorial Methodist Church at Grahamstown, explains that his church played indirect roles in dismantling apartheid by enhancing both democratic culture in individuals and unity of the community, although the rural community of Grahamstown was in near chaos as apartheid was reaching its end. He recalls that violence was most common in 1983-85, during which many people in the town were wounded or killed. Marches, boycotts and riots took place often; police patrolled the township, and curfews were regularly enforced. The liberation movement was so fierce that even school children took part. In fact, Mr. Toto's church was burned down by rioters during the upheaval in the township. He remembers that activists were so aggressive that if you refused to participate in these liberation move-

ments, they harassed you in harsh ways. Toward the end of the 1984, school boycotts often took place in the town as a protest against the tricameral parliament, which included Indians and coloureds in the parliament but not blacks.

Meanwhile, the apartheid government used any means to closely monitor and harass the church community. According to Mr. Tutu, the security forces often came to the service to monitor his church. Ministers in the town were sometimes sent to jail. Security police even used tear gas to dismantle the congregation, he recalls.

Despite these obstacles, Grahamstown's church community was able to respond to the individual needs of suffering people. Mr. Toto explains, by providing a place to worship God, churches could "heal each member of the church and give comfort to them" while they were oppressed. Through this process, "ambition [to dismantle apartheid] was cultivated." In other words, local churches planted the seeds of democracy in each individual member.

Surely, the national-level liberation movement by the Church was successful in addressing the importance of nationwide "unity"; however, it was local, rural churches that actually undertook the task. Mr. Toto explains how the local churches played a role in unifying the community: Psychological affiliation with certain churches encouraged the oppressed people to hope, with fellow members, for the end of apartheid. Unity was created not only among black people but also between different groups. According to him, the idea of "unity" perpetuated into the individual's mind regardless of that person's denominational affiliation.

Reverend Tena also claims that his church's slogan, "one undivided church," was supported by local white populations. Finally, the comment by Reverend Mzileni may prove the existence of unity in rural areas. He says all churches in Grahamstown shared the same roles during apartheid, regardless of their racial affiliations. In this way, the local church community was successful in unifying church members in rural areas under one shared objective: ending apartheid.

The local church moderated clashes between government authorities and local black people in physical ways as well. The Reverend

Mzileni describes the local churches' role during apartheid as "mediator." Churches in Grahamstown, including his church, held meetings where local black people and the government could meet and negotiate face to face. Such discussions were held often in the 1980s, when riots and other forms of violence became widely spread around the townships of Grahamstown. Local church leaders in the town were eager to persuade students who had been boycotting to return to school, and funerals for victims of violence in the town were often taken care of by local church leaders.³²

In the 1980s, the bishop of the Ethiopian Church also contributed to creating a democratic atmosphere in Grahamstown by forming the Albany Council of Churches. While the town was emerging in the turmoil of the liberation movement, he played an acute part in the council as the first chairperson. The bishop, also chairperson of Grahamstown Black Ministers' Fraternal, was responsible for meeting with young people in the town, as well as attending conferences that involved the whole township community. Meetings with intellectuals took place in the bishop's residence in the township, although such gatherings were strictly surveyed by the security police.³³

In this way, the church community in the town contributed to the dismantling of apartheid by physically bringing local people and apartheid authority together. The important point here was that these efforts would not have been fruitful without active cooperation from different churches.

The active involvement of local churches in dismantling apartheid acted as a light that guided the people toward a democratic South Africa. Some argued that a new democracy in South Africa would face a difficult reality because the country did not have a history of civil society development. This assumption becomes irrelevant when attention is drawn to the role of local churches. They created stable, reliable, and well-perpetuated civil society in rural areas, such as Grahamstown.³⁴ This is significant in exploring the fundamental issue of how black South Africans finally became capable of establishing a democratic South Africa. Under the authoritarian regime, oppressed people had neither the right to voice their opinions to the regime, nor

the means to do it because of extreme poverty. However, churches gave the oppressed and forgotten rural South Africans the reason and justification to oppose the state.³⁵

Mr. Toto, the Reverend Mzileni, and Reverend Tena all agreed that the basic roles of local churches in South Africa have not changed, even since apartheid was dismantled. The same roles for dismantling apartheid are also needed by today's local black community because the legacy of apartheid still exists. Mr. Toto expresses his concerns about the post-apartheid situation, saying "apartheid was the intention of government to make people suffer." Obviously, a current democratic government does not intend to make its citizens suffer, but the reality is "people are still suffering."

The economic status of blacks, especially those who live in rural areas, has become worse since the breakdown of apartheid. More people are suffering from poverty and unemployment. More than 500,000 people have lost their jobs in South Africa since 1996. In addition, 35 percent of black South Africans are unemployed and 61 percent of black families live below the poverty line, according to a poverty and inequality report in 2000.³⁶ Moreover, 70 percent of South Africans dwell in rural areas, and 70 percent of those live in poverty. Indeed, remunerative jobs and self-employment in rural economies have been insufficient to meet the employment needs of many South Africans.³⁷

Mr. Toto remembers that there were more shops in Grahamstown during apartheid than today, indicating fewer employment opportunities for the town's population. Mr. Toto believes that more investment in the town would help decrease the town's high unemployment rate. In his opinion, white businesses left the town after apartheid because of a vague sense of uncertainty and fear of Grahamstown's future under the new black political rule. According to a 1998 survey, 234,000 white South Africans left the country between 1989 and 1997. Reasons for leaving were the "growing crime rate and level of insecurity in the country," although the apartheid government had collapsed.³⁸

By the same token, social aid from the new democratic government is not adequate, in Mr. Toto's opinion. "We can't wait for government

support," he explains. Economic hardship may lead to a higher crime rate, no matter how vehemently churches teach morality. Chronic problems, such as poverty and AIDS, continue to plague rural peoples, and churches feels it is their civic duty to address these problems.

Because of these economic and social problems, black rural communities are still facing difficult challenges in their daily lives. Therefore, the importance of the churches' presence in local communities not only 'has not changed' but also 'can not be changed'. Rather, they begin to play more crucial roles in today's post-apartheid era and future development of rural communities. As during the apartheid era, today's local church roles can be categorized by two objectives: psychological effects on people and physical effects for the development of rural communities.

Psychological healing for individual blacks in rural communities became increasingly necessary because of various economic and social hardships mentioned above. Mr. Toto emphasises the church's role of providing a place for worship. Before the church, every worshiper is equal, whatever the hardships they face. However, Mr. Toto stresses the idea of "psychological healing" by adding that the church is a place to worship, not "to find the solution" to hardship.

On the other hand, the Reverend Mzileni's Ethiopian Church is active in finding this "solution" to the economic and social hardships Grahamstown's black community is facing. Believing that "action is more than talk," his church is launching several community programs that establish self-esteem among black individuals by encouraging them to become "creative" about how to make an independent living. His church is eager to educate people in Grahamstown in cooperation with the local government. Under his leadership, in February of 2003, his church hosted a talk given by the South African Police Service in the township. The purpose of this meeting was to educate community members on many issues—domestic violence, women and child abuse, criminal offense, and drug abuse among them—all of which are urgent problems in Grahamstown. He continues, "We are also having adult educational programs in collaboration with the local government for disadvantaged adults during the apartheid."

Promoting education for adult members of the community is one of the Reverend Tena's important tasks as well. He currently expects a literacy campaign by his church to be successful. The Reverend Tena's efforts today in developing the community in the post-apartheid era sprung from his strong belief in "unity" of the community. He seeks to achieve unity among different religions, churches, races, and ethnic groups in the Grahamstown. When the church community holds a meeting, it includes all church communities in Grahamstown, he explains: "Anglican, Methodist, Presbyterian churches—so called main-line churches—the Zion Christian Church and Ethiopian Church, all get together to discuss social matters in the community." Dr. Gaybba also emphasizes the importance of unity as a force that constitutes the new democratic South Africa. Thus, unity seems to be a crucial key for the further democratic development of local communities and South Africa as a whole.

Reverend Tena's strong belief and hope in this unity reflect his decision to not take an active part in Grahamstown Christian Council whereas he is a key member of the Makana Council of Church. He feels it is more important to develop trust among different religions in order to unify the community.

Reverend Tena also acknowledges the church's role in "healing the wounded" because people were not only hurt physically during apartheid but also affected psychologically. "Whites are also the wounded," in his opinion. Similarly, the idea of forgiveness reflects his desire for "unity" among victims and perpetrators. He is committed to visiting his hospitalized church members and raising funds for their treatment when needed. These activities by churches are an essential psychological cure for people suffering in rural areas.

The church can and should also play a significant role in the education of future leaders. The Reverend Tena uses former President Nelson Mandela as an example. "He was educated in a local Methodist Church, and the first large conference he attended after the release from prison was the conference of Methodist Church to thank the church." In fact, Mandela later announced, "[I]f it had not been for the United Methodist Church, I would still be in my village."³⁹ This

speech by Mandela implies how influential the rural church's education projects are for the young.

On the other hand, severe economic and social problems in Grahamstown moved the church community to help in physical and practical ways to fulfill people's material needs. The Reverend Tena occasionally convenes with the mayor of Grahamstown to address concerns about township community. The last time he met the mayor, he pointed out the lack of transportation and sufficient building, and the poverty of the community. "You can not just remain [in] silence when these problem[s] are arising," he explains. Promoting self-sufficiency in the township community is essential for the long-term sustainable development of the rural community.

The local church community has not only been a crucial actor in helping rural people in psychological and material ways, it has also established an efficient relationship with local authorities. The way local churches relate to the current democratic government is different from the national-level church's stance. The latter tends to speak from a point of view similar to that of the national government, perhaps because both represent the majority of South Africans' voices. On the other hand, the churches at the local level keep their distance from the authority as a separate organ, identifying themselves as a voice from the voiceless.⁴⁰

In other words, the way local churches relate to political authority has not changed, unlike the national Christian church, which opposed the apartheid government but is not officially against the current government. Mr. Toto believes the church's attitude toward government should always be a "guide" to policy makers. Community self-sufficiency through gradual reduction of governmental dependence is seen as desirable for the community. "Although the local government gives financial support to the poor black community, it is church that takes initiative," notes Mr. Toto when describing the relationship between his church and the Grahamstown government. Although the Reverend Mzileni thinks the Ethiopian Church should be close to both the government and the people, he describes the church's approach to politics as a "guide," not dogma. Advising the government to eradicate corruption is possible only through such an

advisory role. Reverend Tena describes the church as a “watchdog” that leads government to the “right way.”

Reverend Tena believes that churches, in guiding the local government, eventually help to develop the local community. Identifying each other’s different roles contributes to building a more effective cooperation between the two entities. For example, when the local government failed to efficiently allocate its budget for community development projects, it asked the church community for the proper account of aid. Such cooperation would not have been realized if neither acknowledged the different roles of the other and “trusted” each other.

Local church communities will play significant roles for further development of the rural community. In fact, church leaders have clear, feasible objectives to fulfill the needs of individual blacks in the future. The Reverend Mzileni will focus on building better family relations, raising more awareness of child abuse and reducing the divorce rate in Grahamstown’s township. He is also eager to educate children by launching a leadership project in schools.

The Reverend Tena is also eager to introduce new projects in the town despite “a lot of strives” in past years in improving local black individuals’ quality of life. He wants to build a new HIV/AIDS shelter for patients in the township. For the development of the country, “rural areas are key,” the reverend.

As a leader of mixed races in the church community in Grahamstown, the Reverend Tena still can see a psychological division between different races, especially among the older generation. Such concern is also expressed by Dr. Gaybba. According to him, “the idea of white church has gone, but unity will only come slowly.” A language barrier is also an obstacle: different groups in the town to go to separate churches for services. Long-term separation along racial lines has prevented people from knowing, understanding, and trusting each other. But Reverend Tena expresses his hope that the young generation will eventually break these racial walls, though the outcome will be visible slowly.

Launching a democratic government surely brought black people freedom. It is true that the national church movement had an important role in achieving this, gathering attention from the masses na-

tionally and internationally during apartheid. And the national-level church community will continue playing major roles in the morality and democracy of South Africa. In this sense, it is a symbolic institution that continues to exist in the minds of South African Christians. Because of this symbolic role, the South African church community is capable of conveying a new democracy for South Africa, as it did during the apartheid era.

However, if it had not been for the rural church community's ground-level, grass-roots efforts to cultivate democratic culture among individuals in rural areas, South African democracy would not have been realized. Today, the local church's role should be emphasized because of their more direct approach to individual needs and rural development. They have already taken steps forward to a new phase of democracy. Their effort to promote self-sufficiency in poor communities will eventually result in overall development of South Africa. Their capacity to educate individuals, old or young, will create more democracy-minded people in the society. If the democratization of South Africa depends on how different racial identities come together, the local church community is instrumental in uniting them. Local churches provide people who suffered from apartheid with shelter and the hope to develop in the future. This hope leads people to overcome the harsh past without forgetting history. This hope will be passed down to the next generation without leaving apartheid values to the young. There is a long time ahead to eliminate the legacy of apartheid; however, the local churches' success in dismantling the apartheid system proves that they have the ability and responsibility to lead the country to that new era.

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Carlos Marighella

Walking a line between
terrorism and revolution

NICO ARMSTRONG

Written in 1969, Carlos Marighella's *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla* outlined the strategy and tactics for waging a successful urban terrorist campaign. Almost purely methodological and free of ideological trappings, his work rapidly circulated across the globe, providing perhaps the most widely-used blueprint ever for terrorists of all stripes and colors. By the late twentieth century, however, Marighella's plan had failed for the Tupamaros of Uruguay, the Red Army Faction of Germany (RAF), and the Red Brigades of Italy. It became clear that although tactically brilliant, Marighella's blueprint for terrorism was strategically flawed; his major miscalculation was a result of his failure to understand the nature of the states he proposed to destroy.

Marighella's strategy was simple. By violently attacking the security forces of the state and the economic interests of the elite, the state would be forced to take harsh and repressive measures. But instead of destroying the terrorists, the measures of the government would merely show the people how violent and brutal their government truly was, while at the same time giving the impression that the government was losing

control and the terrorists gaining it.¹ Fed up with the repressive government, the people would join the rebellion, which would spread to the countryside and become a general all out revolt. As Marighella himself wrote, "The role of the urban guerrilla, in order to win the support of the population, is to continue fighting, keeping in mind the interests of the people and heightening the disastrous situation within which the government must act."² All the urban guerrilla had to do was attack the interests of the powerful, and the revolution would soon follow.

Marighella's tactical advice, the nuts and bolts of how to successfully attack the state and live to attack the state another day, was much more detailed and in-depth, and it was drawn from observations of the then unfolding terrorism campaign of the Tupamaros in Uruguay.³ Marighella wrote on nearly every aspect imaginable for waging a terrorist campaign, from robbing banks to raise money to raiding armories for weapons and kidnapping important figures. His incredible attention to detail left almost nothing out and, without a doubt, was a reason for his manual's great world-wide popularity.

According to criminology professor David R. White in his book *Terrorism Update 2002*, "the Tupamaros epitomized urban terrorism".⁴ Their leader, a law student named Raul Sendic, rejected the rural based *foco* theory of Che Guevara Uruguay's population was massively concentrated in the capital city of Montevideo (120) and probably also because Sendic was generally unfamiliar with the countryside and the peasant population. Instead, in his effort to topple the dictatorial Uruguayan government, Sendic embraced the theory that would be later published by Marighella. He planned a terrorist campaign with a group of like-minded students in Montevideo, using the multitudes of people and the twisting alleys of the city as his jungle. In 1963 they armed themselves by raiding a hunting club (an "armory" for beginners), and they spent the next five years increasing in size and building support networks in the city. They organized in small cells, or "firing groups," perfectly designed for a decentralized terrorist campaign, supported by larger support columns (129). An executive committee was formed to keep track of the cells and dispense harsh punishment to those who disobeyed.

By 1968, they were ready to strike, and they pulled off a series of daring broad-daylight bank heists in Montevideo. The government responded as Marighella had predicted—with harsh repressive measures, especially in the face of increasingly brazen attacks. The Tupamaros upped the pressure, kidnapping and assassinating government officials; and by 1970, their power, through fear and prestige, had grown almost to the level of the Uruguayan government (123). However, they never did win the support of the proletarians for whom they claimed to be fighting. Although Tupamaros wooed the working class with food and other handouts, the increasing level of murders and violence perpetuated by the organization horrified the majority of Montevideo's public. Instead of rising up in arms against the government, the people enthusiastically supported the repression of suspected Tupamaros (128). With support evaporating, Tupamaros was on the brink of destruction by 1972, a dizzying fall from their zenith of power in 1970 when the organization included three thousand terrorists.

Despite the failure of Tupamaros, their philosophy of urban terror included in Marighella's manual was very popular internationally. By 1969, it had already found its way to West Germany. Three radical students—Andreas Baader, his girlfriend Gudrun Ensslin, and Ulricke Meinhoff—formed the nucleus for a urban terror organization first known as the Baader-Meinhoff Gang, and later more formally as the Red Army Faction (176). They employed Marighella's tactics almost to the word. Robbing banks and kidnapping rich businessmen was their *modus operandi*, and they later graduated to hijacking airplanes and cooperating with Palestinian terror organizations. However, primarily because of Baader, their organization lacked the fierce internal discipline demanded by Marighella. With his ego inflated by his initial Robin Hood reputation among many Germans, Baader seemed more interested in gaining personal notoriety than in advancing the revolution. For instance, his vanity dictated that the organization only use BMWs as getaway cars (176). Partially due to this attitude, he and Meinhoff were in jail by 1972. The organization, however, lived on, repeatedly reviving itself after each new set of leaders was arrested.

The RAF never attained the size or power of Tupamaros, but this may have been to its advantage. With fewer followers, the organization was much harder to crack. Like Tupamaros, however, their initial support dried up after their tactics shifted from daring bank robberies to kidnappings and brutal murders. The 1977 murder of pilot Jurgen Schumann during a hijacking seemed to be the last straw, definitively turning the German public against the RAF (177). Although the RAF did not officially surrender until 1998, they were in actuality nearly irrelevant by 1985. Far from causing a revolt in Germany, they spurred the creation of a dominating internal security service in a country trying to escape its Nazi past (178).

The tactics described by Marighella failed for the RAF and Tupamaros, both ideologically leftist organizations created by radicalized university students, but which operated in very different political climates. Tupamaros emerged in a country experiencing a major economic crisis and increased government repression of peaceful means of protest (120). Their potential well of active supporters was huge. The RAF emerged in a democratic country in the middle of a postwar industrial boom. Their potential following was miniscule. Though Tupamaros certainly brought more grief to the Uruguayan government than the RAF did to the West German government, in the end both groups were dismal failures. This failure can be in part be attributed to specific actions of each group. By turning to individual murders and executions, both the RAF and Tupamaros were committing an act recognized as extremely evil by most people, and thus were violating Marighella's rule to never alienate the popular base. For Tupamaros, the turning point was the 1970 execution of American police advisor Dan Mitrione, and for the RAF it was the murder of the airplane pilot. Other groups styled after Marighella's manual committed the same error: The Italian Red Brigades killed Italy's prime minister (179), and the American Symbionese Liberation Army provoked horror when they murdered Myrna Opsahl during a bank robbery while she was depositing money for her church.⁴

For organizations that depended on popular support, these errors were fatal, but in the final analysis the flaw in Marighella's strategy

is found in his blueprint. The idea that an urban terrorist campaign can create the conditions for revolution is false. Marighella failed to realize that the provision of security is the most important reason for the existence of the state, the reason why people agree to be ruled in the first place.⁵ When terrorist attacks move beyond operations that merely embarrass the government to bombings and shootouts in the streets, ordinary people will demand the government step in and protect them. Recent experience in the United States after the attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center shows how quickly people are willing to give up rights in exchange for security. The central tenet of Marighella's theory, that the people would rise up once they saw the repressive nature of the state, was therefore fundamentally wrong. But that is not the only flaw in Marighella's blueprint. The decision to strike in the city first, before building a movement in the rural areas, is also foolish from any revolutionary standpoint. In most countries—and especially in countries of the Third World—the city is where the government is strongest, where its power can be felt by nearly everyone.⁶ Especially in the Third World, governments follow policies that favor city dwellers over country dwellers,⁷ and the city is therefore where the terrorist will find the least amount of popular support. In the country, however, far away from the center of government power, live the people who are often the most distrustful of the state, the least indoctrinated, and the most marginalized.⁸ A planned revolution must begin with control of the rural areas and then proceed to capture the cities, not the other way around. In fact, all successful revolutions that involved long guerrilla campaigns—among them those in China, Cuba, Vietnam, and Nicaragua—began in the countryside. Chairman Mao's model for revolution has been infinitely more successful than Marighella's.

Marighella's formula provides a brilliant study in tactics that, when properly deployed, allows the urban guerrilla to perform in the most efficient method possible; however, the strategic underpinning that postulates that urban terrorism is the path to revolutionary victory is false. One type of terrorist, though, has been more successful with urban terror than the ideological terrorists discussed above, but

this exception proves the rule. This is the ethnic terrorist, who fights for a nationalist cause, usually surrounded by a sea of his co-nationalists who view the ruling government as illegitimate. A group of people who from the beginning want independence change the situation of the state completely. With sustained support, the nationalist terrorist can use Marighella's urban terrorist tactic with impunity, as has been seen in the very strong organizations of the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka and the Irish Republican Army. However, they can never win, because the opposing state is supported by another ethnic or religious group that vociferously hates the group represented by the terrorists. What results is endless violence. The terrorists push out the moderates in their own community and seize leadership, but they can never overthrow the state and achieve formal independence unless their ethnic group greatly outnumbers those represented by the state. So, even in this very different circumstance, Carlos Marighella's *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla* provides an excellent blueprint for terrorism but a terrible one for revolution.

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On Jua Kali

The informal sector of
the Kenyan economy

EMILY S. GETMAN

Jua Kali, the Kiswahili term for “under the hot sun,” is also the term for the informal sector of the Kenyan economy. Typically, industries in this sector consist of micro or small businesses, employing zero to nine workers.¹ Some say that Jua Kali workers are employed in traditional Kenyan industries;² that is, they insist that Kenyan peoples have always worked in these fields. Others claim that Jua Kali industries were created by Indian immigrants, who trained local people for the purpose of exporting traditional Indian goods. This group claims that Kenyan workers gradually realized that they could produce and sell these goods on their own, and thus the sector was created.³ Whichever theory is correct, the Jua Kali sector has come to play a major role in Kenya’s urban economies.

Jua Kali workers can be employed in a number of professions. Among the most common are mechanics; metalworkers; mitumba, or secondhand clothing retailers; woodworkers, most commonly making furniture; and sellers of fruit and vegetables.⁴ A worker in the Jua Kali sector can do any range of work his own abilities and materials will allow, but access to materials and training are usually the greatest

barriers to expansion of this sector. Many workers in the Jua Kali sector seek to produce goods that will be bought locally. They use little capital (machinery, tools), and instead substitute human labor. As a result, jobs quite labor intensive, but due to the low price of labor, it also makes the products very inexpensive.

Jua Kali workers face many dangers within their employment. Because the sector is primarily illegal and unregulated, businesses do not adhere to government health and sanitary government codes. Many employees, therefore, face environmental and health risks. The World Bank lists the most prevalent of these risks:

- The constant threat to workers from the presence of hazardous substances.
- Dangerous working conditions and unsafe work practices.
- Inadequate, or non-use of, protective equipment.
- Inappropriate work site location.
- Lack of health facilities such as first aid clinics and proper sanitation services.
- Information deficiencies.
- Low priority given by entrepreneurs and workers to problems.
- Diminished Productivity due to sickness and injury.⁵

Many of these risks are associated with the workplaces of Jua Kali businesspeople. They literally work “under the hot sun,” with little protection from the elements. Because their businesses are so close together, contaminants from one business (such as fumes from metal-working) may also affect the people around that business.

Four hypotheses have emerged explaining why the Jua Kali sector has come to play such a large role. The first argues that the rise of the Jua Kali sector originates in the decline of the agricultural sector in rural economies.⁶ Because unemployment and low wages in the agricultural sector, the unemployed or underemployed have flocked to Kenya’s urban areas in search of employment. When they find none, many are forced into the informal sector, where they must utilize their ingenuity and abilities to create employment for themselves.

A second reason why the Jua Kali sector has expanded so quickly so recently is the slow growth in the formal sector of the economy.⁷

Because migration and population growth rates are significantly greater than formal sector economic growth, the Jua Kali sector is the only option for labor overflow.

A third reason is the cutbacks in employment in the government civil service. Structural adjustment plans aimed at stopping budget deficits have cut civil service employment, resulting in higher rates of unemployment in the formal sector.⁸ Though bloated numbers of government employees have added to the inefficiency of bureaucracies throughout Africa, workers often have little or no alternate employment.

A fourth reason for growth in the Jua Kali sector is the lack of employment opportunities for not only for unskilled laborers but also for university graduates and other educated people in Kenya.⁹ Many nations complain of "brain drain," the process by which the highly educated migrate to developed nations in search of higher paying jobs and greater opportunities. Though the problem of brain drain exists in Kenya as in other nations, many educated people return to Kenya. However, Kenya is not cable of absorbing its highly educated into the workforce, and repatriates are confronted with increased levels of unemployment and low demand for their skills. Though the prevalence of university educated workers in the Jua Kali sector is small, it is perhaps the most surprising component.¹⁰

The Jua Kali sector is of great importance to the Kenyan economy mainly because of the large numbers of people it employs. In 1996 it was estimated that 61 percent of the urban labor force in Kenya worked in the Jua Kali sector.¹¹ If the reasons for Jua Kali sector growth listed above are correct, then presumably this sector has been growing since 1996, especially due to the drought in 1999–2000. Jua Kali may now employ over half of the jobholders in Kenya.

Though the Jua Kali sector can obviously thrive without outside (e.g., government, World Bank) assistance, it can be aided through the efforts of these groups. Through the Jua Kali Voucher Program, the World Bank assisted the Kenyan government in subsidizing training vouchers. This program, aimed specifically at the informal sector, has been met with great success. The program encouraged Jua Kali employees to apply for training vouchers, for which they would pay a

fraction of the cost. They could redeem these vouchers with approved providers of training in either specific trades (to aid business expansion), management, or finance. One of the purposes of this program was to increase demand for the new profession of Jua Kali employee trainer, while also increasing the supply of trained workers in the Jua Kali sector and thus increasing the productivity of this sector. The World Bank here notes that through this program, "80 percent of trainees reported business growth, 60 percent established business networks and interlinkages."¹² It also noted that "the program effectively raised the productivity of the beneficiaries and agencies and stimulated development of sustainable market demand for and supply of productivity-enhancing training and services."¹³ Increased productivity is especially important because it will raise the income levels of Jua Kali workers through increased output.

This report went on to note that the voucher training program, which ended with the year 2002, was slowed by the Kenyan government. Apparently, the government could not reimburse trainers for these vouchers within a reasonable time period. This caused major setbacks in the program since trainers were reluctant to introduce new programs without having been paid for completed programs. However, the overall positive effects of the voucher program were well received, and it seems that implementation of similar programs would expand the variety of services and products offered by the Jua Kali sector.

This program has conclusively shown that the Kenyan government and development institutions such as the World Bank can have a significant impact on the informal sector. Though the phenomenon of the informal sector exists due mainly to failures by these recognized institutions to reduce poverty, it does not follow that Jua Kali is against or adverse to involvement by these institutions. There are many ways the Kenyan government and development organizations can elevate the standard of living of many Jua Kali workers as well as increase the quality and quantity of their output. Through the approved trainers, these institutions can address crucial quality of life issues, including the availability of medical care.

The dangerous as well as illegal nature of some Jua Kali professions prohibits employees from benefits such as health care. Jua Kali workers find gaining access to doctors and health care is almost completely impossible. Even such elementary measures as heat safety could help workers improve their quality of life and become more economically productive. The Global Development Research Center notes that, "although people do become acclimatised [to severe heat], most of these workers, as a result of the combined effects of malnutrition and exposure, suffer from headaches, heat cramps, and dizziness."¹⁴ This report goes on to note that noxious gasses, which are produced as a result of their trades, commonly affect both mechanics and metalworkers.¹⁵ However, due to the highly labor intensive nature of their trades (highly labor intensive), many workers cannot leave their businesses for any extended periods of time to attend safety workshops, even if the workshops are subsidized by an outside network.

One proposed compromise is a series of single day workshops for the purpose of informing Jua Kali workers about the hazards inherent in their jobs.¹⁶ The attendees would have to be compensated in some way, though not necessarily in monetary compensation. Provision of first aid materials and a free meal might be enough to entice many people to attend. These workshops could teach Jua Kali workers how to use safety equipment and how to seek help if they have been severely affected by work conditions. Of course, the government or perhaps the burgeoning Jua Kali Associations would first have to secure this access to health care for these underpaid workers.

Another government option to help the Jua Kali sector is to ensure universal primary education. Because there is not enough market demand for highly-educated university graduates, funneling more and more money into the echelons of higher education may be wasting Kenyan funds. Instead, funds should be used to improve the scope of primary and secondary education in both the rural and urban sectors of Kenya. By doing so, the Kenyan government may hope to establish higher literacy levels and a more well-balanced, homogenous population in terms of education.

Another immediate action recommended here which would improve the Jua Kali sector involves cooperation between the Kenyan government of Kenya, Jua Kali workers, and Jua Kali Associations. The urbanization in Kenya, as in many developing nations, includes a prevalence of temporary housing and squatter camps. The tenure many Jua Kali workers have over their land in many cases is not legal. Typically, the Kenyan government and especially the Kenyan police forces have acted in hostile ways toward Jua Kali workers, evicting them from their places of work and residence. Jua Kali stabilization would require cooperation from the government in this regard.¹⁷

The government has attempted to outline its own objectives: stabilizing the Jua Kali sector, improving access to land titles for Jua Kali businesses, and improving access to temporary licenses on land.¹⁸ Specifically, the government in 2000 envisioned its goals for providing vending space to Jua Kali businesses:

- closing roads at certain times
- setting aside little used back lanes and open spaces near markets
- use of car parks from 6 p.m. to mid-night with adequate security¹⁹

However, these reforms—perhaps due to inefficiency of the government bureaucracy—were never implemented. Jua Kali workers are still in need of stable, central markets where their goods can be sold. The establishment of markets require access to public land, which can only be granted by the Kenyan Government.

Closely linked to this is the issue of access to credit. One of the main reasons why Jua Kali business owners have difficulty gaining access to credit is because they have no land or property to use as collateral. Often, the land on which their businesses are located is not their own, and the government may not even know who does in fact own this land. De Soto has done many studies exploring the nature of access to land in undeveloped nations.²⁰ He has found that lack of access to land—and thus to capital—usually exists because governments have no stringent land access or property right laws; thus a

person may spend years gaining access to a land title in a developing nation, but they can never be fully assured that their land will not be claimed by someone else, or that they will be able to keep their claim on that land (and thus gain access to capital).

Creating a land regulatory system that guaranteed temporary access to land in the crowded areas most prone to migration could have a large impact on Jua Kali businesses' access to credit. Due to the rapid speed of business creation and destruction in the Jua Kali sector, a system based on permanent land holdings might have a smaller, less significant effect.

The issue of access to capital is one which has enormous potential to expand and integrate the burgeoning informal sector.²¹ One reason Jua Kali businesses must be so labor intensive is that they do not have access to credit as a formal business would. Because Jua Kali proprietors lack the ability to take out loans to improve their businesses, many companies stagnate; and though the company continues to produce a surplus, it is quickly eaten away by short term needs. Private investment firms such as the Grameen Bank have shown that investing in small amounts can in fact be very lucrative. This open market is just waiting to be tapped in Kenya.

The Jua Kali sector could also greatly benefit by an extension of infrastructure to the heavily populated poorer areas of urban Kenya. Lack of access to clean water and sewage treatment severely impinge upon the ability of Jua Kali workers in the Kenyan economy to reach high productivity. Diseases spread because of these inadequacies, keeping Kenyan workers from reaching their productive potential and causing major inefficiencies in the Kenyan economy. Overall improvements, such as reduction of poverty, could also assist with the problem of productivity. When a person has a high quality of life, she is more likely to be a healthy, productive worker. She is more likely to work one job instead of two, resulting in less work fatigue, and she is more likely to have higher morale and motivation.

The main factor leading to population growth in the cities of Kenya is urban/rural migration. Enticed by higher wages in urban areas than in rural areas, people flock to cities in search of opportunity.

However, due to great amounts of unemployment already evident in these cities, migrants often join the informal sector, either permanently or until they can find a better paying job in the formal sector (or both). This process leads to higher amounts of poverty in the urban sectors and makes the informal sector more competitive.

To reduce unemployment in the urban sector demand for labor must increase in that sector. This can be accomplished by encouraging formal investment and business activity; however, implementation of this strategy without addressing the root problem of migration may in fact heighten unemployment. Attempting to raise the number of jobs in the urban sector can have the effect, not only of employing more urban workers, but also increasing migration. The better the chances a rural worker has of procuring a job in the urban formal sector, the more likely that worker is to migrate. Rural development must coincide with urban development, or the problems the urban sector now face will simply be exacerbated.

One of the most complex issues concerning Kenya's Jua Kali sector, or any large informal sector, is that of permanency. Many current development economists choose to ignore the informal sector, assuming that if the formal economy is able to expand the labor market so as to reach full employment, the informal sector will simply die out. Lured away by the promises of higher wages and greater employment benefits, many people will no longer be forced to eke out a living in the labor intensive informal sector.

To some extent this may be true; however, Kenya's Jua Kali sector is a good indicator of the larger problems which exist in the Kenyan economy. Those conditions which force people into the Jua Kali sector—unemployment and underemployment, low wages, and poor development in the rural sector—are long-term problems which must be solved before the Jua Kali sector will completely disappear. Considering the length of time this will take, responding to the immediate needs of the Jua Kali sector now while planning for the long term seems to be the best option for Kenyan economic actors.

The issues which directly relate to the growth and expansion of the Jua Kali sector comprise some of the most important economic stum-

bling blocks in Kenya. The issues addressed here will not only aid in the development of the informal sector, but will help the Kenyan economy improve as a whole. If national and international groups focus on these long-term problems, both the economy of Kenya and the well-being of her people will be improved, and by all estimates, the Jua Kali sector will dwindle (though perhaps never truly disappear).

To conclude, the Jua Kali sector of the Kenyan economy is a vibrant, explosive component of Kenyan urban life. It represents the ingenuity of the Kenyan people, who have created this sector to fulfill their own needs. These needs originated when such formal structures as government economic plans and IMF structural adjustment plans failed to provide Kenyans with jobs and higher living standards. Acting on their own intuition, labor, and entrepreneurial ability, these artisans have created economic power without the two powerhouses of western business: land and capital.

Jua Kali artisans, however, are still in need of assistance. Their sector exists out of necessity and provides for little luxury. Only collaboration between Jua Kali, the Kenyan government, and outside organizations will have the means to improve the lives of Jua Kali artisans. Long-term goals rather than short-term solutions can be achieved by this collaboration, allowing Kenya to reach its full potential.

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9. Ibid.

10. Avril V. Adams, "Assessment of the Jua Kali Pilot Voucher Program," World Bank Report. <<http://www.worldbank.org/education/economicsed/finance/demand/case/kenya/juakali.htm>>. Page three notes that less than 4 percent of recipients were university educated. This figure affirms the existence and may indicate the percentage of the highly educated in the Jua Kali sector; however, because this study measured training voucher applicants, the numbers of university educated may be skewed.

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21. Todaro, 331.

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What Is Taking So Long?

Obstacles within Russia on joining
the World Trade Organization

TINE KRACUN

With the accession of China to the World Trade Organization in 2001, the only major world economy that remains outside this organization is Russia. Although Russia has been negotiating to join the WTO for the past ten years, the intention of Russia's politicians to do so is unclear, clouded by political and historical aspects, including problems that remain from the times of transition (e.g., corruption and lack of legislation. Regardless, of all the obstacles and doubts, Russia's accession to the WTO would be beneficial for the Russian economy as a substantial boost for further economic growth.

The generational switch in the Soviet Union with the nomination of Mikhail Gorbachev as the Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party in 1985 also meant a switch to a different perspective on the future of Communism. Gorbachev saw the current state of Communism doomed to collapse and therefore in need of reform. Although the reform programs of Perestroika and Glasnost were launched in order to keep the Communist system alive, they ignited the critics and ushered in the failure of the system, even-

tually leading to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Russian Federation remained as the sole descendent of the Soviet Union. In 1991, Boris Yeltsin rose as the president of the Russian Federation and decided to reform Soviet central economic planning into a Russian free market economy.

The main aspect of transition was to be privatization. Large Russian industries had been underproducing for years, and few would be able to survive in a competitive market. The leading Russian economists suggested a "shock therapy" transition, what was about to lead to a failure. The transition was to be conducted in the minimum time possible, which gave the people too little time "to first understand and digest the results of the first stage of the reform, including the liberalization of prices which had caused production and consumption to plummet."¹ Citizens were issued vouchers of nominal value to buy public sectors, but because many citizens were on the verge of poverty, large amounts of these vouchers were bought by several individuals at a price lower than its nominal value. As a result, large amounts of public capital were acquired by corrupt and well-informed officials who used their ties and connections to undermine any legislation that might hinder their gain of capital. Consequently, the Russian public sector privatized by 1997 was bought for only \$12 billion.² These clear indications of corruption essentially led Russia into a crisis and remain an obstacle to Russian integration into the world market even today.

The internal state of Russia described above and the corresponding events in the world, including the Asian financial collapse, led to a crisis in 1998 when the Russian government was forced to devalue the ruble. These events marked the turning point for the Russian economy; ever since, Russia's GDP has experienced growth of about 5 to 10 percent annually.³ Its exports and imports as well as Foreign Direct Investment have also increased. The one step Russia still needs to undergo to be integrated into the world economy is to join the World Trade Organization. Russia applied for admission to the WTO (then GATT) in June of 1993, and a Working Party on the accession of the Russian Federation was established within the WTO. Negotiations have been taking place ever since and have swayed from the

dead point to being very productive and optimistic. Topics that are under discussion include agriculture, the customs system (customs union and other trade agreements with CIS states), excise taxation and national treatment, import licensing, industrial subsidies, national treatment, SPS and TBT, TRIMs, TRIPS and services.⁴ On December 18, 2002 an agreement was reached to accelerate the work during the first half of 2003, and the latest Draft Working Party Report commenced on May 27, 2003.⁵ The report was not published due to WTO's policy restricting access to documents concerning applicant's accession until negotiations are completed.

The WTO, as of April 4, 2003, has 146 members and, with the accession of China in 2001, represents all major world economies. The former Soviet states which have been admitted are Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Moldova. Russia's admission would foster economic reforms important to the country and to the global economy.⁶ Accession to the WTO will help Russia's economy become more transparent and predictable, which would encourage foreign investment. It would also further open the markets for exports as well as encourage imports. For example, foreign businesses would be interested in investing in the oil and gas industry, probably the most prospective industry in Russia, thus increasing energy exports. In the long run, more foreign competition and investment would allow Russia to reduce its debt, at \$146.7 billion as of 2001.⁷

Regardless of all the benefits that Russia would experience from joining the WTO, there is still heated debate on this issue. This debate can be seen as a clear battle between protectionist and liberal politics. The government is primarily pro WTO accession and has been continuing the negotiations despite many disagreements among the involving parties. The officials from the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, the office responsible for negotiations, have continuously reiterated the importance of Russia's accession to the WTO, and Minister German Gref stated that, as a result of anti-dumping procedures in place against Russian companies, "Russia loses up to \$4 billion every year."⁸ On the other hand, the position of President Putin is that although Russia should join the WTO, doing so should

not be the nation's first priority,⁹ which in diplomatic terms means that Russia would not join under just any circumstances; rather, it is trying to negotiate the best conditions.

The Russian public atmosphere is, in general, very reluctant to any foreign influence on the Russian economy. The arrest a few months ago of Mikhail Khodorkovsky on tax fraud has been often associated with his intentions to sell parts of his largest Russian oil company, Yukos, to foreign investors. It has been speculated that Putin used the pre-election time to gain support from the public by threatening businessmen who gained their wealth through fraudulent privatization, and by portraying himself as the protector of the Russian industry from foreign, particularly Western, investment.

In fact the majority of Russians would rather see their government maintain economic ties to neighbor countries of the Community of Independent States, which includes some of the former Soviet republics.¹⁰ Although the Russian government has given preference to the ties with the CIS on certain occasion,¹¹ the problem of more integration within the CIS is that most of these countries work towards joining the WTO themselves (Ukraine could realistically join the organization within the next year.)¹² Because most of the CIS countries are potential members, the WTO would not allow any trade benefits among these states that could harm other WTO members. On the other hand, most of the former Soviet republics are suffering economically, and although Russia's exports to these countries might be significant now, it is questionable whether such levels will be sustainable in the future.

The aim to develop closer ties with the CIS reflects a desire to echo the past supremacy of the Soviet Union in the international system, and it reflects the Russian public's fear that its sovereignty is threatened by Western powers (once the enemy). However, this approach makes security and survival of the state of prime importance while minimizing national economic interest, thus establishing protectionist economic policies.¹³ Although most government officials, conversely, share a liberal view, they do not understand that the rules of accession to the WTO are not subject to negotiation; the core requirements are standard for all

the countries seeking membership.¹⁴ Although accession to the WTO would be more beneficial for the Russian economy, the debate ignited on both sides of the issue keeps the country indecisive.

The other obstacles are of a technical nature. Precisely, legislative problems remain one of the core impediments on Russia's path towards the WTO. During one of the recent negotiations, Russia failed to respond to two-thirds of the questions posed by the Working Party regarding laws and policies.¹⁵ The problem of legislation has its roots in the wild and uncontrolled privatization, whereof several individuals gained their wealth illegally. These individuals remain influential in the Russian law-making process today, and since a stricter legislation is not in their interest, they hinder Russia's acceptance by all the means necessary.

The second problem remains tariffs. Overall Russia has one of the lowest tariff levels, averaging from 7 to 15 percent.¹⁶ Russia has also been able to consolidate tariffs into four major groups: raw materials, semi-finished goods, foodstuffs and finished products. However, Russia does not agree with WTO terms that say all appropriate tariffs have to be introduced in three years; Russia would rather see it done in seven years.¹⁷ Nonetheless, the major obstacles remain specific industries important for Russia's economy and national prestige, but which are not competitive to their western counterparts. Their existence therefore depends on the imposed tariffs. The foremost industry in such a situation is the aircraft industry. The Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft demands zero tariffs on a wide range of aircrafts.¹⁸ The Russian aircraft industry was one of the most important icons during the Cold War as a counterpart to Western aircraft industries. After the collapse of the Berlin Wall, however, the industry did remain competitive; most of the former Warsaw Pact countries now prefer Western airplanes, which are safer and cheaper. Therefore, the only remaining market for Russian aircraft producers is Russia, and since their survival is, if historically reasoned, in the national interest, it is protected by tariffs on imports.

A similar case is the automobile industry, which is currently protected by 25 percent tariffs on foreign imports.¹⁹ Clearly, if these tariffs

were eliminated as required for accessing the WTO, the Russian car industry would not be able to compete with Japanese and Korean car manufacturers. Essentially, it would not be beneficial for the Russian steel industry either. With 7 percent of Russia's exports, the steel industry is highly dependent on export; and although one might therefore think that the steel producers would strongly push for accession to the WTO, they do not. The main consumers of Russia's steel industry are Russian automakers; if Russia joins WTO, the car industry will suffer, and the steel industry would have to find a substitute for a substantial portion of its market. Russian politicians have therefore indicated the desire to raise car import tariffs to 35 percent upon joining the WTO²⁰—probably unacceptable by WTO standards.

Protectionist politics and tariffs are two major problems of liberalization of the Russian economy, but others exist. The banking sector remains controversial in Russia as it is not open to foreign competitors. The WTO requires a more competitive banking sector—which most of the influential Russian bankers oppose, petrified that irregularities of the Russian banking system may become transparent. Protection of intellectual property rights is another issue that remains unresolved. Pirated CDs, CD-ROMs and DVDs are still being sold for two to three dollars across the country. Pirating remains a special concern to the United States, as most of these products are copies of U.S. origin.²¹ It is questionable what effects restrictions on the sale of these products would mean for Russia's economy since many young people without jobs make a living by selling these products. Russia is also not interested in increasing the prices of oil and gas—its prime exports—as requested specifically by the European Union.²² Although the WTO would probably provide larger export markets for Russian petroleum in the long run, there is fear that increased oil prices might harm Russia's industry in the short run.

Russian politicians have to decide whether they will lead Russia decisively on the path towards the WTO or away from the WTO and head in the other direction, towards a closer integration within the CIS. Clearly, some industries will suffer from the increased liberalization of the Russian economy required by the WTO; however, ac-

cording to the law of comparative advantage, jobs in these industries ought to be substituted with increased production in other industries, making them competitive on the global market. But the problem in Russia is not only economic; it is essentially an issue of historical and political identity. Russia has been aiming to become an influential actor in the international system since the time of Peter the Great, and it achieved its aim with the introduction of the Communist paradigm as a state system. Although the world sees the collapse of the Soviet Union as a positive event, the Russian people do not. They look at the times of the Soviet Union as the part of history when they were a superpower, when they led (at least a part) of the world. From this perspective, we can understand the problems of negotiations. As is precisely the case in the aircraft industry, the Russians desire to protect the icons of the past, and they do not want to change their country's whole economic structure to join the WTO.

With such a sentiment among the majority of the public, the newly educated pro-Western elite cannot make a strong public appearance supporting the accession because it might inspire an even larger nationalistic sentiment which could bring the Communists (who remain strong in the Russian politics) to power. The governing elite therefore makes attempts towards keeping close ties to CIS—which on the other hand is also beneficial because CIS nations remain large trading partners. It is nevertheless clear that the Russian economy needs more transparency and competitiveness to sustain its growth; and these can only be achieved through closer integration with healthy and strong Western economies via accession to the World Trade Organization. Although the Russian economy might lose in the short run, in long run the capital and labor will move to competitive industries. Russia ought to become a power among the Western powers.

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Der 11. September 2001

Richtungswechsel in der
amerikanischen Aussenpolitik

ELIZABETH A. HAAG

Welche neuen Doktrinen in der Aussenpolitik vertreten Mitglieder der Bush-Regierung als Reaktion auf die Terroranschläge auf die USA am 11. September? Die Antwort auf diese Frage ist nicht nur für die Personen wichtig, welche die Aussenpolitik der Vereinigten Staaten entwerfen, entwickeln und ausführen. Auch ausländische Politiker und Würdenträger sind direkt oder indirekt von amerikanischen politischen Entscheidungen betroffen, ebenso wie Menschen auf der ganzen Erde, die sich um ein besseres Verständnis der Situation in unserer zunehmend globalisierten Gesellschaft bemühen. Eine genaue Kenntnis der neuen Doktrinen, die bei der Festlegung der Politik massgeblich sind, ist notwendig für eine zu-

ABSTRACT

This paper argues that September 11, 2001, marked the beginning of a sea-change in American foreign policy. General topics to be addressed within the paper have been organized into four sections. First, attacks of September 11, 2001, are briefly reviewed to provide a backdrop of understanding for why this series of events

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verlaessige Vorhersage und Beurteilung der tatsaechlichen Konsequenzen der amerikanischen Aussenpolitik, die die Grossmachtstellung des Landes dazu benutzt, um ihre regionalen Interessen zu schuetzen.¹

Die vorliegende Arbeit stellt heraus, dass der 11. September 2001 den Beginn eines Kurswechsels in der amerikanischen Aussenpolitik markiert. Meine Ausfuehrungen sind in vier Teile gegliedert. Am Anfang steht ein kurzer Rueckblick auf die Ereignisse des 11. Septembers 2001, um zu verdeutlichen, warum die Serie von Anschlaegen solch schwerwiegende Folgen fuer die Vereinigten Staaten und ihre Regierung hatte. Es folgt ein Ueberblick ueber die Richtlinien der amerikanischen Aussenpolitik direkt vor dem 11. September 2001, die durch die Beachtung des internationalen Rechtes und Multilateralismus gekennzeichnet war. In diesem Kontext wird auch die fruehere Bedeutung des Multilateralismus fuer das internationale Recht und die kollektive Sicherheit analysiert. Der dritte Teil der Arbeit geht auf die drei neuen Richtlinien der Aussenpolitik ein, die von den Mitgliedern der Bush-Administration seit dem Richtungswechsel angewendet werden. Jede dieser Doktrinen (Praeventivschlaege, Regimewechsel und der interna-

Abstract continued

made such an impact on the United States and its administration. The second section provides an overview of American foreign policy during the time-period shortly before September 11, 2001. The importance of multilateralism in international law and collective security is analyzed here. The third section of the paper focuses on the three new foreign policy doctrines used by realists in the Bush administration since the sea-change. Each doctrine (preemption, regime change and the international sharing of information on suspected terrorists) is discussed as it applies to American foreign policy. It is argued in the fourth section of the paper that these new doctrines, rather than those used before September 11, 2001, have indeed been applied by the Bush administration. The theoretical and empirical applications of these three new doctrines are systematically analyzed before the backdrop of the war in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq. The conclusion ties together and discusses the primary consequences of this sea-change in American foreign policy. Mainly, it discusses the unilateral exercise of power by the United States, the demonstration that it will take action if it is felt that (primarily American) security is threatened, and that the notion that sovereignty is no longer uppermost in the administration's thinking. An epilogue is included to provide a supplemental forum for the author's personal interpretation and analysis of the new foreign policy doctrines.

tionale Austausch von Informationen zu mutmasslichen Terroristen) wird auf seine Bedeutung fuer die amerikanische Aussenpolitik hin untersucht. Im vierten Kapitel der Arbeit wird herausgestellt, dass diese neuen Grundsaeetze in der Tat seit dem 11. September 2001 das Handeln der Bush-Regierung bestimmen und die alten Doktrinen weitgehend ersetzt haben. Die theoretische und empirische Anwendung dieser drei neuen Schwerpunkte werden systematisch vor dem Hintergrund der Kriege in Afghanistan und im Irak analysiert.

Die Zusammenfassung bietet eine Buendlung und Diskussion der unmittelbaren Konsequenzen des Kurswechsels in der amerikanischen Aussenpolitik: Die Vereinigten Staaten ueben ihre Macht unilateral aus, demonstrieren, dass sie aktiv werden, falls die—vorwiegend amerikanische—Sicherheit gefaehrdet ist, und dass der Gedanke der Souveraenitaet von auslaendischen Regierungen nicht mehr hoechste Prioritaet im Denken der US-Regierung hat. Im abschliessenden Epilog gibt die Verfasserin eine persoenliche Interpretation und Analyse der neuen aussenpolitischen Grundsaeetze.

DER GRUNDSAETZLICHE RICHTUNGSWECHSEL IN DER AMERIKANISCHEN AUSSENPOLITIK

Gruende fuer die intensive Reaktionen in Amerika

Der 11. September bildete den Anlass fuer einen Kurswechsel in der amerikanischen Aussenpolitik. Im Kollektivbewusstsein des amerikanischen Volkes wurde der Terrorismus zuvor als ein unseliges Phaenomen betrachtet, das sich in anderen Teilen der Welt abspielte. Sogar tragische Ereignisse wie die Explosion im World Trade Center zu New York im Jahr 1993, die auf das Konto von Omar Abdel Rahman ging, sowie der von Timothy McVeigh durchgefuehrte Bombenanschlag auf das Bundesgebaeude in Oklahoma City gingen schnell in der taeglichen Nachrichtenflut unter. Die Ereignisse des 11. September jedoch ruettelten die Amerikaner wach, denn es war das erste Mal seit dem Angriff auf Pearl Harbor im Dezember 1941 (bei dem 2403 Menschen getoetet und weitere 1178 verwundet wurden),

dass die Vereinigten Staaten innerhalb ihrer Grenzen eine solch schwerwiegende Bedrohung ihrer Sicherheit erlebten.²

Zweifellos stellte die hohe Zahl der Opfer den grossten Schock fuer die Amerikaner dar. Mehr als 3000³ unschuldige Leute starben in New York City, in der Hauptstadt Washington sowie im laendlichen Suedwesten Pennsylvanias an den direkten Folgen des Anschlags. Dr. Tahid Shad, einem Experten fuer internationale Organisationen und den Mittleren Osten, stellte fest: "we [America] had bombings before...but nothing on this scale. The economic, social and psychological impacts as a result of the attack[s] took an enormous toll on the nation as a whole."⁴ Eine enorme Fuelle von Medienberichten, welche die Ereignisse des 11. September 2001 uebertrugen, dokumentierten und kommentierten, weckte bei vielen Buergern das Interesse an aussenpolitischen Themen. Sehr haeufig wurde in der Bevoelkerung die Forderung geaussert, einen unilateralen Angriff auf Osama bin Laden, die Al Qaeda und schliesslich die Taliban in Afghanistan durchzufuehren, all dies im Namen der Selbstverteidigung. Selbstverteidigung ist eine international anerkannte (siehe Art. 51 der Charta der Vereinten Nationen) und in den Vereinigten Staaten populaere Rechtfertigung fuer militaerische Vergeltungsschlaege.⁵ Die Bush-Regierung griff diese weit verbreitete Ansicht auf und entwickelte neue Grundsaeetze der Aussenpolitik, die staerker auf amerikanische Interessen als auf internationale Belange und Abhaengigkeiten Ruecksicht nahmen.

Realist Administration – Erklaerung der Reaktion

Die Anschlaege vom 11. September 2001 fuehrten, wie bereits dargelegt, zu einem Wandel der amerikanischen Interessen und Prioritaeten in Uebersee.⁶ Im Gegensatz zu dem bisher verfolgten, eher multilateralen Ansatz nahmen Praesident Bush und eine Anzahl seiner einflussreichen Ratgeber und Kabinettsmitglieder—unter ihnen Donald Rumsfeld—an, dass die Interessen der Vereinigten Staaten besser mit unilateralen Methoden gewahrt werden koennten. Nur 30 Stun-

den nach den Attacken des 11. September 2001 in New York City, Washington/DC und Pennsylvania, berief sich ein Land erstmals in der Geschichte⁷ des nordatlantischen Verteidigungsbuendnisses auf Absatz fünf des NATO-Vertrages, demzufolge, "an armed attack against one or more of [NATO member countries] shall be considered an attack against them all."⁸ Obwohl Hilfe der NATO-Partnerstaaten sofort bereit stand, zoegerte die Bush-Regierung, ihre Unterstuetzung anzunehmen. Fuer dieses Verhalten waren zwei Gruende ausschlaggebend. Zum einen fuerchteten die Amerikaner, sie muessten ihre Autonomie bei der geplanten militaerischen Vorgehensweise preisgeben. Zum anderen bezweifelte man die Faehigkeit der europaeischen Alliierten, "to conduct a military campaign outside the North Atlantic theater."⁹

Der Anschlag vom 11. September 2001 veraenderte die amerikanische Aussenpolitik dahingehend, dass sie nicht mehr auf der kollektiven Sicherheit¹⁰ durch die Beachtung des internationalen Rechts, der Vereinten Nationen, der NATO und aehnlichen Organisation beruhte, sondern statt dessen von unilateralen Ueberlegungen bestimmt war. "Since [the United States government] began planning a global response to the terror attacks of September 2001, the Bush Administration has worked from the assumption that at some point in the future America might have to operate alone."¹¹ Es hat den Anschein, dass die US-Regierung seine Annahme ("assumption") bereits in die Praxis umgesetzt hat.

DAS JAHRZEHNT DES INTERNATIONALEN RECHTES UND MULTILATERALISMUS

Internationales Recht

Das internationale Recht ist besonders komplex, da es sich mit unabhengigen und souveranen Staaten beschaeftigt. Vor dem juengsten Kurswechsel in der amerikanischen Aussenpolitik waren die Vereinigten Staaten durchaus dazu bereit, das internationale Recht anzuwen-

den, um Streitigkeiten in der internationalen Staatengemeinschaft zu beseitigen. Im Herbst 1998 wurden die Vereinten Nationen alarmiert, dass Afghanistans amtierende Taliban-Regierung Osama Bin Laden und Al Qaeda-Mitglieder unterstützt hatte, indem sie ihnen Zuflucht und Ausbildungslager zur Verfügung gestellt hatten, zum Schaden anderer Länder und internationaler Organisationen.¹² Der Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen, dem die Vereinigten Staaten angehören, verlangte von der Taliban, dass sie ihre Unterstützung der Al Qaeda und somit des internationalen Terrorismus beenden sollte. Zur gleichen Zeit wurden Osama bin Laden und einige seiner Helfer in den Vereinigten Staaten vor Gericht gestellt, da sie einen Bombenanschlag auf die amerikanische Botschaft in Ostafrika¹³ verübt haben sollten. Als die Taliban sich weigerten, bin Laden und andere angeklagte Terroristen auszuliefern, warteten die Vereinigten Staaten geduldig, als der UN-Sicherheitsrat Resolution 1267 unter Berufung auf Absatz sieben der UN-Charta verabschiedete, die besagte, "that the Taliban turn over Osama bin Laden without further delay to appropriate authorities in a country where he has been indicted."¹⁴ Der Grund für diese Aktion sowie für die Verurteilung der Taliban für ihre destruktive Wertschöpfungslosigkeit in Resolution 1333, war, dass "the Taliban's actions constituted a threat to international peace and security."¹⁵ Die Vereinigten Staaten waren zu diesem Zeitpunkt noch bemüht, das internationale Recht nach Möglichkeit zu achten, daher warteten sie, dass bin Laden und die Al Qaeda auf legale Weise vor Gericht gestellt würden.

Kollektivsicherheit

Die zweite Hauptdoktrine, die amerikanische Außenpolitik wichtig vor dem Richtungswechsel war Kollektivsicherheit. Kollektivsicherheit wurde im hohem Grade in den neunziger Jahren als seit dem 11. September 2001 von den Vereinigten Staaten.¹⁶ Kollektivsicherheit, im Vergleich mit Vorkaus, konzentriert auf die Länder, die zusammen durch internationale Organisationen arbeiten, um Weltpapieremissionen in einer diplomatischen Weise anzufassen. In den neunziger Jahren hat Amerika viel mehr mit UNO und NATO gearbeitet, und

viel mehr geduld mit internationales Recht gehabt. Man kann das in dem Kosovo-konflikt gut sehen. Aber, seit dem 11. September 2001 haben die Amerikaner vast nur fuer sie selbst da.

NEUE PRAEMISSEN DER AUSSENPOLITIK DER USA

Militaerische Praeventivschlaege ("preemption doctrine")

Als erste der neuen Doktrinen ist die der "Preemption" zu nennen. Preemption ist eine Taktik, die von der Bush-Regierung angewandt wird, um Beeintraechtigungen amerikanischer Interessen zu verhindern. Dies geschieht, indem Informationen gesammelt und praeventive militaerische Aktionen durchgefuehrt werden, um Sicherheitsrisiken auszuschalten.¹⁷ Die Bedeutung der "Preemption" liegt darin, dass sie das Gegenteil von traeger Selbstzufriedenheit bildet. Letztere Einstellung machte es ueberhaupt erst moeglich, dass Osama bin Laden und die Taliban die Anschlaege von 2001 erst durchfuehren konnten.¹⁸ "Preemption" wird als eine Form von praeventiver, antizipatorisch Selbstverteidigung gegen potentielle Bedrohungen angesehen.¹⁹²⁰ Die Betonung liegt hierbei auf dem Wort "antizipatorisch". Haetten die Vereinigten Staaten sofort auf die Anschlaege des 11. Septembers 2001 reagiert, anstatt einen Monat zu warten, waere es einfacher gewesen, die Reaktion als Selbstverteidigung zu kategorisieren. Stattdessen wandten die Vereinigten Staaten eine Doktrin an, die es ihnen erlaubte, in der Zukunft Praeventivschlaege durchzufuehren, was auch in Afghanistan und dem Irak der Fall war.²¹ In Afghanistan griffen die Vereinigten Staaten nicht nur ihre Agressorin, die Al Qaeda an, sondern auch die amtierende Taliban-Regierung. Obwohl die Taliban der Terrorgruppe wichtige Unterstuetzung gaben, waren sie nicht direkt fuer die Anschlaege in Amerika verantwortlich und sollten daher nicht zum Ziel der amerikanische Militaerschlaege geworden sein. Zieht man den Angriff auf den Irak als Beispiel heran, so war das Vorgehen voellig antizipatorisch. Dies wird nicht nur durch die Tatsache demonstriert, dass der Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen, in dem die Vereinigten

Staaten staendiges Mitglied sind, "measures necessary to maintain international peace and security" eingeleite hat.²² Hinzu kommt, dass die Bush-Regierung immer noch nicht in der Lage ist, ausreichend konkrete Beweise zu erbringen, um solch einen uebereilten Angriff unter dem Deckmantel der Selbstverteidigung zu rechtfertigen.

Sturz und Wechsel von Regimen

Neben der "Preemption" erwies sich die Doktrin des Wechsels von Regierungen als nuetzlich fuer die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika. Innerhalb zweier Jahre seit dem Kurswechsel wurden nicht weniger als zwei Regierungen, die von der Bush-Administration als Bedrohung fuer die Vereinigten Staaten angesehen wurden, von Militaertruppen unter amerikanischer Fuehrung gestuerzt: in Afghanistan und im Irak.

Katha Pollitt, ein Kolumnist der Zeitschrift "The Nation", bemerkte, dass Bevoelkerungsschichten, die kaum ueber politische Bildung verfuegen, die Bedrohung durch den Terrorismus sehen und die Versprechen eines Regierungswechsels und der Einfuehrung der Demokratie begruessen.²³ Politt charakterisierte die von den Amerikanern gesteuerten Medien in Afghanistan und dem Irak als, "functioning as a cheerleader for the U.S. military." Dies hat zweifellos zu einer Staerkung der Position der amerikanischen Truppen in den besetzten Laendern gefuehrt, deren Aufgabe nun darin besteht, den hoffentlich unblutigen Uebergang zu neuen und friedlicheren Regierungen zu ueberwachen.

Die Doktrin des Regierungswechsels kann auch als Warnung fuer andere Regierungen dienen, die Terroristen in ihrem Land dulden oder auf andere Art amerikanischen Interessen schaden. Die Vereinigten Staaten haben klar gezeigt, dass sie nicht zoenern, Taten folgen zu lassen, nachdem sie einen Feind gewarnt haben. Sie haben auch demonstriert, dass sie auch notfalls ohne die Genehmigung des UN-Sicherheitsrates militaerisch aktiv werden. Die Hauptsache hinter dem Regierungswechsels ist um Diplomacie zu gehen, und sehr schnell eine "threatening" Regierung mit einer "non-threatening" Regierung ersetzen.²⁴

Austausch von Geheimdienstinformationen ueber Terroristen

Der Austausch von Geheimdienstinformationen zwischen den Vereinigten Staaten und anderen Laendern hat seit dem 11. September 2001 zugenommen.²⁵ Obwohl viele Amerikaner es bevorzugen wuerden, nicht auf die Hilfe anderer Laender angewiesen zu sein, haben aussenpolitische Berater erkannt, dass man amerikanische Interessen im In- und Ausland nur dann praeventiv gegen terroristische Aktionen verteidigen kann, wenn man auslaendische geheimdienstliche Erkenntnisse in die Auswertung einbezieht. Der Krieg gegen den internationalen Terrorismus wird an vielen Fronten gefuehrt. Weiterhin benoetigt,

an effective campaign against terrorism requires accurate and timely intelligence to locate cells and their planned activities. It requires alert, trained law enforcement, immigration services and border patrols, as well as flexible teams ready to respond when important information is revealed. Finally, it requires time, dedication and resources.²⁶

Um diesen Erfordernissen zu entsprechen und um sicherzustellen, dass amerikanische Interessen geschuetzt werden, fuehrte die Bush-Regierung eine dritte, etwas weniger unilaterale aussenpolitische Doktrin ein.

Diese dritte Doktrin, die den Aufbau eines internationalen Netzwerkes zum Austausch von Informationen ueber Terroristen und ihre Aktivitaeten²⁷ bezweckt, hat grosse Bedeutung fuer die Vereinigten Staaten nach den Anschlaegen auf das World Trade Center und besonders auf das Pentagon—Amerikas militarisches Fuehrungszentrale—am 11. September 2001. Es gibt seit langem eine Flut von Sicherheitswarnungen, und das Pentagon war schon immer ein logisches Ziel von Anschlaegen. Wenn es schon frueher ein Netzwerk gegeben haette, das es den amerikanischen Sicherheitsbehoerden ermoeeglicht haette, glaubwuerdige Warnungen aus den oft unzutreffenden Meldungen herauszufiltern, haette die Regierung die Al Qaeda-Attacken vielleicht verhindern koennen. Die Doktrin des

Informationsaustauschs duerfte bei einer konsequenten Anwendung kuenftig Anschlaege auf die Vereinigten Staaten und ihre Alliierten erschweren oder gar unmoeglich machen.

DIE PRAKTISCHE ANWENDUNG DER THEORETISCHEN DOKTRIN

Angriff auf Afghanistan

Der Angriff auf Al Qaeda und die Taliban-Regierung in Afghanistan war eine Konsequenz des Richtungswechsels ameikanischer Aussenpolitik. Unmittelbar nach den Attacken auf New York City und Washington/DC wandte sich Präsident Bush an die amerikanische Nation und verkueundeten einen weltweiten "war on terrorism". Laender wie England, Japan, Russland, China, India, und Pakistan, auch mit vielen, vielen Anderen, haben Amerika geholfen.²⁸ Am Anfang sah Alles wie eine gute Idee aus. Aber zugleich versaeumten es Bush und seine Regierung, internationale Organisationen, besonders dem UN-Sicherheitsrat hierbei jegliche formale Beteiligung zuzusprechen. "While the U.S. Administration assembled what appears to be a global alliance against international terrorism, it reserved to itself the right to decide how to use force, including when and where it should be used."²⁹ Die amerikanisch Regierung hat angefangen, Aussenpolitik mit militaerischen Praeventivschlaege und Unilateralismus zu benutzen, um gegen zukuenftige terroristische Angriffe zu schuetzen.

Vast sobald wie die Angriffe passieren sind, gab es konkrete Beweise, in die Richtung Al Quaeda und Osame bin Laden als die verantwortliche Terroristen. Obwohl bil Laden nie offizielle Verantwortlichkeit nahm, ist es herausgekommen, dass bin Laden Video-baender freiwillig gab, in denen er die "hijackers" fuer ihre Arbeit pries. Bin Laden angekuendigte drohend auch, weitere Angriffe auf Amerika. Nach der Taliban-Regime, die de facto Regierung in Afghanistan, entscheidet sich, nicht mit den Vereinigten Staaten zukoo-perieren und Osamd bin Laden und die Al Qaeде Leute Amerika zu

geben, hat die Vereinigten Staaten gegen Afghanistan "Airstrikes" seitdem 7. Oktober 2001 angefangen. Diese Operationen waren von Gruendkaempfer mit amerikanischen und allied Soldaten und Marines gefolgt. Nicht spaeter als Sommer 2002, waren die Taliban-Regierung und Al Qaeda Grueppen, am Mindestens in Afghanistan, zerstoert worden.³⁰

Angriff auf den Irak

Der Angriff auf den Irak folgte, obwohl seine Rechtmaessigkeit noch heute stark umstritten ist, den neuen aussenpolitischen Doktrinen der Bush-Regierung. Vor dem Angriff verabschiedete der UN-Sicherheitsrat eine einstimmige Resolution,³¹ in der er die Regierung des Irak dafuer verurteilte, dass sie nicht mit den neutralen Inspektoren kooperierte, die auf der Suche nach Massenvernichtungswaffen waren. Dennoch waren nach Aussage von Roger Normand (Direktor des Center for Economic and Social Rights) die Vereinigten Staaten hiermit nicht zufrieden, da der Sicherheitsrat verfuegte, dass kein Mitgliedsland die Resolution als einen Kriegsgrund verwenden koenne, ohne zuvor vom Gremium eine zweite Resolution erwirkt zu haben. Die amerikanische Regierung traute dem Irak nicht und fühlte sich von Saddam Hussein bedroht, daher bemuehte sie sich, eine zweite, schaeferere Resolution gegen den Irak zu initiieren. Da diese nicht verabschiedet wurde, setzte die Bush-Administration am 17. Maerz 2003 ihre erste neue Doktrin—Preemption—in die Tat um und griff den Irak ohne Genehmigung des Sicherheitsrates an.³²

Der Grundsatz der Preemption wurde im Irak erstmals angewandt, als die amerikanische Bundesregierung öffentliche Warnungen an Saddam Hussein richtete, in denen sie die Bedingungen nannte, mit denen ein Militaerschlag verhindert werden koenne. Auch hier gilt, dass eine Festlegung der US-Aussenpolitik auf dieses Prinzip vor dem Richtungswechsel 2001 wahrscheinlich zur Folge gehabt haette, dass die Vereinigten Staaten sich auf das internationale Gesetz, die multilaterale kollektive Sicherheit sowie internationale militaerische Unterstuetzung haetten stuetzen können. Die Bush-Administration

war jedoch nicht mehr so geduldig wie frueher und sie beschloss, die Militaeroperation durchzufuehren, gleichgueltig ob andere Laender sich beteiligten oder nicht. Der bereits erwaehte Normand charakterisierte die gegenwaertige amerikanische Regierung als revolutionaer aufgrund ihrer neuen strategischen Politik der "full spectrum dominance" in den Bereichen des Militaers, der Wirtschaft und der Politik. Die USA wuenschen keine Konkurrenten, fuhr Normand fort, und kein anderer Staat solle auch nur daran denken, die Weltmacht herauszufordern. Eine solche messianische Ideologie stoert das Bild Amerikas im Ausland und ist besonders gefaehrlich, resumierte er, da in Gegensatz zur Al Qaeda, viele Mitglieder der derzeitigen Bush-Regierung Fundamentalisten mit Regierungsgewalt sind.³³

Saddam Hussein und seine Regierung kamen bekanntlicherweise den Forderungen von Praesident Bush nicht nach. Daraufhin drang das amerikanische Militaer in den Irak ein, eroberte die Hauptstadt Bagdad und entmachtete Saddams Regime. Somit wurde die zweite neue aussenpolitische Doktrin—Regierungswechsel—durchgefuehrt. Die Amerikaner begnuegten sich nicht mit dem Sturz der Regierung, sondern zerstoerten alle Symbole—Statuen, Bilder und andere Objekte, die die alten Machthaber in einem positiven Licht zeigten. Weiterhin verteilte das US-Militaer Propagandaschriften, in denen um Verstaendnis fuer das Vorgehen der Vereinigten Staaten sowie um Sympathie fuer die Demokratie geworben wurde, und es wurden im Rundfunk Reden von Praesident Bush ausgestrahlt. In einer Rede Bushs an an die Buergler des Irak versprach er ihnen am 4. April 2003, dass,

The government of Iraq, and the future of your country, will soon belong to you. ... We will end a brutal regime...so that Iraqis can live in security. We will respect your great religious traditions, whose principles of equality and compassion are essential to Iraq's future. We will help you build a peaceful and representative government that protects the rights of all citizens. And then our military forces will leave. Iraq will go forward as a unified, independent, and sovereign nation that has regained a respected place in the world. You are a good and gifted people—the heirs of a great civilization that contributes to all humanity.³⁴

Die Doktrin des Regierungswechsels ist im Irak durchgefuehrt worden, aber es wird noch einige Zeit vergehen, bis man sehen kann, ob die Politik erfolgreich war: ob der Irak auf Dauer ein friedliches und demokratisches Land wird, mit einer Regierung, die mit den Vereinigten Staaten zusammenarbeitet, anstatt Drohungen gegen sie auszustossen. Die dritte Doktrin—Austausch von Informationen ueber Terroristen und ihre Aktivitaeten—wird auch durchgefuehrt, indem gefangen genommene Mitglieder von Saddam Husseins Regierung und andere Kriegsgefangene verhoert werden. Ein Ende der Mission ist bisher nicht abzusehen.

SCHLUSSBETRACHTUNG

Die amerikanische Aussenpolitik hat—wie in dieser Arbeit ausfuehrlich dargelegt wurde—seit dem 11. September 2001 einen Kurswechsel von 180 Grad vollzogen. Nach einem Jahrzehnt, in dem das internationale Recht und die kollektive Sicherheit Prioritaet hatten, traten nun drei neuen Doktrinen an ihre Stelle, die unilateralen Charakter haben. Anderen Laender und internationale Organisationen kommt seitdem die Aufgabe zu, Informationen mit den Amerikanern auszutauschen, um gemeinsam gegen den Terrorismus vorzugehen, wobei sich die Vereinigten Staaten zugleich Art und Umfang des militaerischen Vorgehens vorbehalten. Die Bush-Regierung hat in Afghanistan—mit Osama bin Laden und der Taliban—und im Irak—mit Saddam Hussein—gezeigt, dass die Vereinigten Staaten in der Lage sind, ihre Macht unilateral auszuueben, um durch Preemptionen und Regierungswechsel amerikanische Interessen schuetzen zu koennen, wann immer sie bedroht erscheinen.

Ein weiterer wichtiger Schluss ist, dass die gegenwaertige Regierung der Vereinigten Staaten nicht zoegern wird, konsequente Schritte zu tun, wenn sie ihre nationale Sicherheit gefaehrdet sehen. Wie anhand des Beispiels des Kriegs gegen den Irak deutlich wurde, warteten die Amerikaner nicht auf die Erlaubnis der Vereinten Nationen, bevor sie ihr Militaer nach Bagdad schickten, um Saddam Husseins Regier-

ung zu entmachten. Waehrend dieser Mangel an Geduld und diese Zurschaustellung von Macht von Nutzen sein können, um amerikanische Buerger zu schuetzen und potenziellen Terroristen zu zeigen, dass die Vereinigten Staaten es ernst meinen und Angriffe nicht passiv hinnehmen werden, stellt dieses Vorgehen zugleich ein schlechtes Vorbild fuer andere internationale Akteure in der Zukunft dar.

Weiterhin ist bei einer naeheren Betrachtung der amerikanischen Aussenpolitik seit dem Richtungswechsel festzustellen, dass der Gedanke der Souveraenitaet anderer Staaten nicht mehr einer der wichtigsten Grundmaximen des Denkens und Handelns der amerikanischen Regierung ist. Wenn die Staatssouveraenitaet in der Aussenpolitik der Bush-Regierung wichtig gewesen waere, haette diese vor einem militaerischen Angriff gewiss mehr bilaterale Verhandlungen gefuehrt und internationale Organisationen wie die Vereinten Nationen einbezogen. Ob man glaubt, dass die Vereinigten Staaten bei ihren Handlungen gerechtfertigt war, ist ein anderes, aber eng verwandtes Thema.

ANHANG

Was sind nun die Auswirkungen dieser neuen aussenpolitischen Doktrinen? Der Unilateralismus hat tiefgreifende Konsequenzen im internationalen Bereich, besonders bei den Beziehungen zu Frankreich und Deutschland im UN-Sicherheitsrat sowie zu anderen Laendern in der Generalversammlung der Vereinten Nationen. Zwar ist militaerische Gewalt notwendig, um Terrorismus zu bekaempfen. Unilaterale Gewalt, die im eklatanten Widerspruch zum internationalen Recht und der UN steht, stellt jedoch einen desastroesen Praezedenzfall³⁵ fuer moeglicherweise gefaehrliche Regierungen und Organisationen dar. Der Kurswechsel in der amerikanischen Aussenpolitik ist auf der internationalen Buehne schnell deutlich geworden, und er fand das Missfallen vieler enger Verbueundeter, deren Hilfe Amerika wohl auch in Zukunft benoetigen wird. Wenn es die hoechste Prioritaet des Praesidenten ist, das amerikanische Volk von in- und auslaendischen Bedrohungen³⁶ zu schuetzen, kann er hierbei durchaus die interna-

tionale Sicherheit in der Zukunft gefaehrden, obwohl dies bestimmt nicht seine Absicht ist.

Es ist kein Geheimnis, dass Praesident Bush bei seiner Amtsfuehrung stark auf seine Berater und Kabinettsmitglieder hoert, wie Powell, Rice, Rumsfeld und Wolfitz. Obwohl die Personen, welche die aussenpolitischen Grundsaeetze fuer die ausfuehrenden Organe der amerikanischen Regierung formulieren, die Vereinigten Staaten und ihre Buerger schuetzen moechten, koennten sie hierbei wohl zu unilateral und pessimistisch sein, was internationale Ereignisse betrifft. Es hat den Anschein, dass man amerikanische Aussenpolitik am besten mit dem Begriff "Realismus" erklaren kann. Die hoechsten Vertreter in der Bush-Regierung, die die Aussenpolitik beeinflussen, sind Realisten. Sie reagieren skeptisch und pessimistisch gegenueber anderen aussenpolitischen Positionen und sie fordern internationale Hilfe bei der Bekaempfung des Terrorismus, jedoch ist es fuer sie voellig selbstverstaendlich, dass die amerikanische Regierung bestimmt, welche konkreten Massnahmen gegen Terroristen zu ergreifen sind. Obwohl ich der Meinung bin, dass es sehr wichtig ist, auf terroristische Angriffe vorbereitet zu sein und sie zu verhindern, denke ich, dass die amerikanische Regierung zu weit geht, indem sie den Kampf in ihre eigenen Haende legt und hierbei oft das internationale Recht und Vertraege verletzt. Um weiterhin ein vertrauensvolles Verhaeltnis zu anderen Staaten haben zu koennen, muessen die Vereinigten Staaten demonstrieren, dass sie gewillt sind, sich an die internationalen Regeln zu halten, deren Beachtung sie selbst von anderen verlangen.

Preemptive Massnahmen, wie Luftangriffe und Bombardierungen sind manchmal notwendig, um Terroranschlaege zu verhindern, aber dies nur, wenn es klare Beweise dafuer gibt. Ich denke, dass die preemptiven Massnahmen gegen die Taliban in Afghanistan gerechtfertigt waren, weil das Regime bekannten Terroristen, vor allem Osama bin Laden und den Al Qaeda-Mitgliedern, nicht nur Zuflucht geboten hatte, sondern auch die Moeglichkeit zum Trainieren. Weiterhin hatten sie mehrere UN-Resolutionen voellig ignoriert. Es gab erdrueckende Beweise, dass die Taliban und die in Afghanistan lebenden Terroristen eine direkte Bedrohung der Sicherheit der Vereinigten Staaten

und anderer Laender darstellten. Der Preemptivschlag auf den Irak zur Beseitigung des Diktators Saddam Hussein und seines Regimes war hingegen nicht gerechtfertigt. Hussein war ein Feind der Bush-Regierung, aber es gab keine eindeutigen Hinweise, dass die irakische Regierung Amerika bedrohten oder Terroristen beherbergte. Auch wurden keine Massenvernichtungswaffen von den UN-Inspektoren gefunden. Die Bundesregierung bleibt weiterhin den Beweis schuldig, dass die irakische Regierung. Praesident Bush machte sich die stark antiterroristische Stimmung in der amerikanischen Gesellschaft zunutze und vollzog einen nahtlosen Uebergang von einem politischen Ziel zum naechsten im Kampf gegen den Terrorismus. Meiner Meinung nach war der Regierungswechsel in Afghanistan gerechtfertigt, nicht jedoch im Irak.

Die neue Doktrine der "collective intelligence", die aus einem organisierten, effizienten und effektiven Netzwerk besteht, das Laender mit den Informationen versorgt, die sie benoetigen, um sich gegen Terroranschlaege zu schuetzen, ist nicht nur eine gute Idee fuer die Vereinigten Staaten, sondern ebenso fuer unsere Alliierten. Leider hat diese neue Doktrin bewirkt, dass die Bedeutung der kollektiven Sicherheit—wie sie von den Vereinten Nationen und der NATO angestrebt wird—fuer die amerikanische Auslandsbeziehungen minimalisiert worden ist. Ich bezweifle, dass die Welt sicherer wird als bisher, falls die Vereinigten Staaten weiterhin eine isolationistische Aussenpolitik verfolgen, Terroristengruppen von anderen Laendern aus operieren und so das internationale Recht missachten und dem gefaehrlichen amerikanischen Praezedenzfall folgen, naemlich preemptive Militaeraktionen und Regimewechsel durchfuehren. Hoffentlich werden die Vereinigten Staaten sich dieser Probleme bewusst und kehren wieder zu einer Aussenpolitik zurueck, die multilateralen Beduerfnissen eher entspricht.

ENDNOTES

1. Mohan Malik, "High Hopes: India's Response to U.S. Security Policies." *Asian Affairs, an American Review* 30, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 104.

2. Fred L. Borch, "Comparing Pearl Harbor and '9/11': Intelligence Failure? American Unpreparedness? Military Responsibility?" *The Journal of Military History*, 67, no. 3 (July 2003): 846.
3. 2,823 in New York City, 189 in Washington, D.C., and more than 100 aboard flight 93 in Pennsylvania. Borch, 849.
4. Dr. Tahir Shad, interview by author, Washington College, 26 August 2003.
5. Jack M. Beard, "America's New War on Terror: The Case for Self-Defense Under International Law," *Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy* 25, no.2 (Spring 2002): 559.
6. Rebecca Johnson and Micah Zenko, "All Dressed Up and No Place to Go: Why NATO Should Be on the Front Lines in the War on Terror," *Parameters* 32, no. 4 (Winter 2002/2003): 48.
7. Johnson, 3.
8. NATO Vertrag. Art. 5.
9. Johnson, 4.
10. The 1990s could be called a 'decade of international law and security.'
11. Bob Woodward and Dan Balz, "At Camp David, Advise and Dissent," *The Washington Post*. 31 January 2002, sec. A1.
12. Beard, 583.
13. Ibid., 582.
14. Ibid., 584.
15. Ibid., 583.
16. Shad.
17. Beard, 560.
18. Jack Spencer, "Presidential Authority in the War on Terrorism: Iraq and Beyond," *The Heritage Foundation*, Backgrounder 1600, 2 October 2002, <<http://www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/bg1600.cfm>>.
19. Ibid.
20. Congressional Research Service, International Law and the Preemptive Use of Force Against Iraq, RS21314, September 23, 2002 (updated) erklärt dass "anticipatory self-defense" ist historisch ein gültiger Teil Internationales Rechts. In 1837, britische Soldaten sind ueber amerikanisches Land gegangen, um ein Kanadisches Schiff zu

zerstoeren. Die Britische dachten, dass das Schiff wuerde gegen England benutzt worden. Die britische Regierung erklarte, ihre Aktionen waren notwendig, um England selbst zu schuetzen. Die Vereinigten Staaten hat diese Erklaerung einfach und sofort akzeptiert.

21. Jonathan I. Charney, "The Use of Force against Terrorism and International Law," *The American Journal of International Law* 95, no. 4 (Oct 2001): 836.

22. Charney, 839.

23. Nicht nur die Leute in Afghanistan und Irak, sondern auch viele Buerger in den Vereinigten Staaten!

24. Shad.

25. Johnson, 12.

26. Ibid., 10.

27. Ibid., 12.

28. James P. Rubin, "Stumbling into War," *Foreign Affairs* 82, no. 46 (Sept/Oct): 46.

29. Charney, 836.

30. Borch, 849.

31. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441.

32. Jane Adas, "NYU Panel Assesses Implications, Consequences of War on Iraq," *The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs* 22, no. 5 (June 2003): 67.

33. Adas, 68.

34. Niall Ferguson, "Hegemony or Empire?" *Foreign Affairs* 82, no. 5 (Sept/Oct 2003): 154.

35. Charney, 836.

36. Jack Spencer, "Why Preemption is Necessary," *The Heritage Foundation*, Webmemo 226, 19 March 2003, < <http://www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/wm226.cfm>>.

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Mariam Bâ

A voice of inner resistance

BRENNA SCHNEIDER

Written African literature is a modern addition to the art which derives from the African continent. Yet even more recent than recorded African literature is the voice of women from within it. Men described, characterized, and portrayed African women for decades. This portrayal was mainly one-dimensional as it came from one point of view, that of men. Women recognized that their voices and their stories were based solely on this biased perception of their roles in society, in the family, and in the household. Their real voices were longing to be heard. Christopher Miller writes in his piece, "Nationalism as Resistance and Resistance to Nationalism in the Literature of Francophone Africa," that women used literature and writings to "point toward liberation in their own ways."¹ The pen became their voice, describing the unique struggles faced by women and presenting their views of the broader social issues facing the African continent. Women were able to combat the patriarchal system as "written word becomes a creative tool of self-expression and a weighty weapon against patriarchy."²

In 1970, the first piece of African literature written by a woman was published.³ "Les premiers romans traduisent le besoin de parler,

de rompre le silence et de se raconter.”⁴ The battle against colonial Africa’s patriarchal system, which hindered the voice of African women, quickly became a common theme in the writings of female authors. But unlike the portrayal of women from patriarchy’s very eyes, “la naissance d’une production littéraire africaine francophone au féminin, jaillissent de nouveaux portraits et des voix de femme diverses, présentant la femme africaine vue de l’intérieur.”⁵ This “vue de l’intérieur” is the expression and portrayal of internal revolutions, of the overcoming of personal struggles as well as the struggles women face as a consequence of living in a patriarchal society.

One African novella that is an ideal illustration of African feminist expression in literature is a piece written by Mariama Bâ in 1980. “[*Une Si Longue Lettre* est à retenir absolument en tant que pierre angulaire du roman africain féminin.”⁶ The key within this novel is the voice of Ramatoulaye, a Senegalese woman whose husband has recently died. Throughout the novella, Ramatoulaye develops her voice, the voice of an African woman who has suffered at the hands of patriarchy and as a consequence of polygamy. She, rather than trying to make social changes toward the elimination of both patriarchy and polygamy, opts to search within herself, within her pain, within her unique situation, and fights her battles so that she is free to express herself and make decisions that are representative of this inner victory.

Ramatoulaye’s individual struggle relates to the universal battles fought by African women opposing both patriarchy and polygamy; “While these women are apparently able to subvert the public transcript more openly, they cannot destroy it.”⁷ Some women, in the face of oppression, are not in the position to destroy the institutions that oppress them, and many outsiders interpret their lack of action as accepting or submissive. The component of literature in women’s procession towards expression and inner revolution shows the true power of their inner voice. The literary component of self-expression is presented by Christopher Miller: “The original African nationalism is one of resistance to colonialism from within.”⁸ This inner resistance is exemplified by women’s opposition as they attempt to overcome a form of

adversity which derives from colonialism: "Thinking about revolting and revolting are not the same thing, but within literature, thinking should perhaps not be so quickly dismissed."⁹ Within this statement lies a question which is essentially the argument of this paper: how does "la vue de intérieur" of "la littérature africaine féminine" allow women to effectively combat their personal struggles as well as the adversities facing the African continent and eventually develop a voice of hope, a voice of confidence, and a voice that has overcome?

In an attempt to fully understand the gravity of the inner battles fought by women like Ramatoulaye, one must first understand the difference between "inner voice" and "outer voice" as well as the choice between a journey within and a journey outward. This paper will first outline Ramatoulaye's progression from silence to expression.

The inner voice being explored by Ramatoulaye is very different from the silence society expected during her marriage and following the death of her husband. Here, in accordance with Islamic law, Ramatoulaye is obliged to spend forty days silently mourning the loss of her husband. Rather than allowing these days to fully silence her, she uses the time to develop her true voice, her inner voice. From an outsider's point of view, one may see silence, yet the truth shown to Bâ's audience is that Ramatoulaye is looking within herself and addressing the root causes of her suffering, not simply those derived from the death of her husband. Though her introspection draws her inward to reflect, she is no longer silent. She works toward the acquisition of a voice that, once developed outward, will have a lasting impression on those who hear her words. At her husband's funeral, Ramatoulaye notices "an exasperated manly voice" which "is quickly forgotten and the brouhaha begins all over again."¹⁰ This is the fate of a voice that has not gone through the process of introspection. Ramatoulaye does not respect or seek to exemplify this type of voice. She is looking for much more as she goes through the process to outwardly present her truths, emotions, and struggles outwardly. This path toward self-understanding and the development of one's inner voice is noted numerous times throughout the novella as well as in numerous pieces of its literary criticism. The novel is in effect a writ-

ten account of Ramatoulaye's process, expressed through a series of letters addressed to her closest friend, Aïssatou. For the process to successfully eliminate Ramatoulaye's silence as well as allow her to develop her inner voice, Ramatoulaye must recognize that society has in fact silenced her voice, that she can overcome this silence through introspection, and that eventually her voice will be heard and will not soon be forgotten.

Eventually Ramatoulaye does realize the social constructs which have silenced her for too long; however, this realization is not immediate. She has to reflect upon and question the practices accepted by the religion which she so strongly supports. Specifically, Ramatoulaye must allow her true feelings about polygamy to surface. This is a painful process. After a twenty five-year marriage, Modou, Ramatoulaye's husband, decides to marry a second wife. Islam permits and accepts polygamy as a valid choice; however, Ramatoulaye cannot accept nor understand his decision to marry one of his daughter's best friends. She "sees it as giving into weakness and egotism, and an attempt to recapture his youth."¹¹ Though she is devastated by her husband's choice, she remains silent. She cannot oppose Islamic law nor her husband's decisions. She "greeted the announcement of Modou's second marriage with a smile and feigned indifference."¹²

Then comes Modou's death, and again she confronts social constructs aimed at silencing her voice. In accordance with Islam, women are expected to mourn in silence for forty days after the death of their husband. When it comes time to complete this religious practice, she accepts and embraces it as a devout Muslim woman: "I hope to carry out my duties fully. My heart concurs with the demands of religion. The walls that limit my horizon for four months and ten days do not bother me."¹³ Though this time in mourning starts as a religious obligation that Ramatoulaye is prepared to fulfill, it soon becomes the tool she uses to introspectively analyze her voice and her life.

This practice falls upon Ramatoulaye as a blessing in disguise, though she does mourn and suffer in silence. She mourns the pain Modou's choice to marry another women caused her and her family. She mourns her lack of voice in the matter and the passive smile

which covered her pain. As Mildred Mortimer states, "The mourning period, an obligation in Islam, provides Ramatoulaye with the time frame in which to write the long letter."¹⁴ The irony lies in the social restriction of her voice, which actually empowers her to explore the development of her own inner voice. She explores this voice through her long letters. "One can say that for Ramatoulaye, writing to Aïssatou is like writing to herself."¹⁵ Through time and written expression, Ramatoulaye makes huge progress on her own path to self-understanding. She truly realizes that she must not remain passive and accommodating. She must look out for herself and overcome the pain that polygamy has brought to her life. As she reflects more and more and writes this long letter, she realizes the battle is hers to win. She is developing an internal voice that cannot be silenced no matter what social restrictions are placed upon her. It is the voice of truth that speaks from within her. This realization, her first step in the process, is illustrated by her reaction to others facing adversity: "Your stoicism has made you not violent or subversive but true heroes, unknown in the mainstream of history, never upsetting established order, despite your miserable condition."¹⁶ She takes the path of her described heroes by overcoming adversity through neither a violent reactionary approach nor the submissive silence that had once directed her life.

After breaking through her oppression and realizing that she would never again allow her voice to be silenced, Ramatoulaye begins to blossom: "The dual process of introspection and writing, of enclosure and disclosure, have led Ramatoulaye to cease questioning Modou's initial rejection. No longer a victim, she now expresses new hope in the future."¹⁷ Similarly, Mortimer states, "by removing her mask, the smile of acquiescence, she recovers her earlier vitality and optimism."¹⁸

After finishing her letters to Aïssatou, Ramatoulaye reaches a deep understanding of her situation, and her inner voice becomes an outer voice of expression. She openly expresses her disapproval of polygamy by refusing to marry any man who believes polygamy to be just and fair. She has become a heroine, her weapon now in the form of written and spoken words. Ramatoulaye is neither "violent nor subversive;"¹⁹ she has become one of the heroines which she

admired earlier in the novel. In essence, this process of movement from silence, to an inner voice, to expression allows her to find her own freedom and balance. Ramatoulaye finally "finds the words to affirm her identity, expressing her conviction that marriage must be a choice between partners, not an arrangement between families."²⁰ In addition to the development of a strong voice reflective of her inner victory, Ramatoulaye goes through an inner journey which allows her to work from within her society without violence or force but with balance and clear understanding.

Part of Ramatoulaye's personal transformation can be attributed to "Ramatoulaye's journey to self-understanding."²¹ This journey is one that she chooses to endeavor internally. In addition to the development of her inner voice, she must travel through time and address the issues that have shaped her life and caused her pain, especially those of polygamy. "Ramatoulaye uses this period to travel in time rather than space."²² This inward travel is a choice. Bâ makes it clear to her audience that there are other journeys away from oppressive societies and institutions which some women choose to make in order to eliminate their suffering. Ramatoulaye, however, does not feel that she is comfortable with such a choice. She has attachments to her culture, her country, and her family and is not willing to sacrifice any of those things. There are many aspects of polygamy, as well as her husband's decisions, which she must take into consideration during her journey. But through the exploration of her true feelings, Ramatoulaye can work past the oppression and the confines which have held her back for so long.

It is important to see polygamy from within the cultural context that Ramatoulaye opposes. Polygamy is accepted by Islam as an economic system and a measure of wealth and status. "La société étant à majorité agricole, il avait un besoin de main d'œuvre pour cultiver les plantations. Les hommes épousaient donc plusieurs femmes afin d'avoir de nombreux enfants."²³ Islam is not the only social institution in support of polygamy. Traditional African tribes also supported polygamy as intertribal marriages allowed for the establishment of relationships between tribes. This was a tool of peace, promoting

understanding and cooperation between people with differing backgrounds and lifestyles.

Though these aspects of polygamy seem beneficial to everyone, there are negative consequences which Ramatoulaye experienced first hand. Polygamy turns wives and children into property that signify a man's individual success and prosperity. Consequently marriages turn into business transactions, rather than a unification of two people who together can develop a strong relationship and family. Women, as property of their husbands, are forced to live within a system of male dominance and patriarchy. Ramatoulaye acknowledges that many other women have experienced this consequence of polygamy and many women have suffered in silence. And of these women with different cultural traditions and individual personalities, each attempts to resolve their suffering in individual ways.

Even within the novel, Ramatoulaye is not the only character who has experienced the pain associated with polygamy. Her friend Aïssatou, who is on the receiving end of the letters, shares many of Ramatoulaye's struggles; Aïssatou's husband has also chosen to have multiple wives. Aïssatou, however, handles her oppression through a completely different set of choices. Aïssatou represents the choice of an outward journey, the denunciation of all that oppressed her, and a distant search for a life free from the pain of polygamy. Aïssatou, after temporarily experiencing the pain and frustration of a polygamous relationship, decides to leave. She leaves Senegal for France, in search of studies, work as a translator, and more importantly, the freedom from institutions that had shaped her oppression. Through her physical journey off the continent, Aïssatou leaves her suffering far behind her. In *Une Si Longue Lettre*, her role may seem secondary—Ramatoulaye, the narrator and letter writer, is clearly the most active character; however, Aïssatou's example of an extreme denunciation of the oppressing forces in her life leaves a lasting impression on her friend. From a distance, Aïssatou provides her friend with exemplary strength and courage through the actions she once took to escape the same oppression.

Ramatoulaye does not make the same choice, but glimpses of her friend's idealistic strength inspire and encourage her to journey in

a different way toward the removal of her suffering. From the beginning, both women handle adversity in separate ways: "Aïssatou rebels, Ramatoulaye acquiesces."²⁴ Ramatoulaye will not even allow herself the recognition that she has been wronged, let alone the right to oppose. As she explores more and more deeply the roots of her suffering, she begins to see that she must question the possibility that her religion could have negative aspects. She must work within herself to surrender the marriage of twenty-five years which she so desperately wanted to keep intact. Even "despite admiration for Aïssatou's refusal of polygamy, [Ramatoulaye] turns the other cheek."²⁵ The women's struggles derive from the same cause: polygamy's negative affects on women. This being so, "Aïssatou acts as a kind of 'ego-ideal' for Ramatoulaye, providing her with a mirror through which to re-view her life, as well as a possible role model."²⁶ By examining her friend's very different choices and seeing the similarities in their experiences with polygamy, Ramatoulaye can benefit from a friend who has overcome adversity and yet realize her own uniqueness and desire to follow her own path towards personal victory. Ramatoulaye does not feel that she wants to separate herself from her society or attempt to correct all the wrongs that have been done to her: "Rather than break with society, she attempts to work from within."²⁷ This work is done from both within the society that defines her life as well as within herself. She recognizes her choices and understands why Aïssatou acted as she did. "Ramatoulaye arguably writes the 'long letter' to Aïssatou upon Modou's death because she was unable to write the 'short letter,' as Aïssatou had done, and thereby reject polygamy."²⁸ Ramatoulaye realizes that she did not want to denounce everything she had ever believed in as her choice of action. She could not make such a drastic journey; she, however, had to make a journey within.

After finishing the letter symbolizing the full development of her voice and full journey within herself, Ramatoulaye reaches a deep understanding of her situation and is now ready to express herself to those around her. She first begins by forgiving her husband. As she writes in her letters, "Yesterday I celebrated, as a custom, the fortieth day of Modou's death. I have forgiven him. May God hear the prayer

I say for him everyday.”²⁹ Her anger and pain have been transformed through the forty days of introspective meditation. Shortly after this huge breakthrough, she has the opportunity to use her voice for the first time. Tamsir, Modou’s older brother, visits her with a marriage proposal. Ramatoulaye sees through his proposal and “declaration of love.”³⁰ She sees before her a conceited man disrespecting the mourning of his own brother, and a man who has already married numerous wives. Ramatoulaye describes the voice she is ready to use as her weapon: “My voice has known thirty years of silence, thirty years of harassment. It bursts out, violent, sometimes sarcastic, sometimes contemptuous.”³¹ She responds, expressing all that she has developed within herself over the last forty days. She speaks on behalf of a voice which will no longer be silenced, on behalf of injustice which she has visited and revisited, and on behalf of the injustice which lies within polygamy. Her response is not only voiced; it is expressed with strength, with grace, with passion, and with clarity:

You forget that I have a heart, a mind, that I am not an object to be passed from hand to hand. You don’t know what marriage means to me: it is an act of faith and of love, the total surrender of oneself to the person one has chosen and who has chosen you.³²

Tamsir tries to silence her, yet she has resolved never to be silenced again. Ramatoulaye finally “finds the words to affirm her identity, expressing her conviction that marriage must be a choice between partners, not an arrangement between families.”³³ Tamsir understands and leaves. She is victorious; not only did she experience forty days of inner victories, but now she vocalizes them. Her voice has been heard. She has won her first battle against polygamy, and she will continue to win.

Daouda is her next suitor as well as the next person Ramatoulaye uses to express her newly created voice. He had proposed before and remains persistent in his attempt to win Ramatoulaye’s hand in marriage. She overtly challenges Daouda’s participation in the National Assembly, which is run by an unacceptable majority of males. She expresses her disapproval: “Four women, Daouda, four out of a

hundred deputies. What a ridiculous ratio! Not even one for each province."³⁴ Though Daouda attempts to justify the lack of feminine representation in the Assembly, Ramatoulaye's voice is louder:

Nearly twenty years of independence! When will we have our first female minister involved in the decisions concerning the development of our country? And yet the militancy and ability of our women, their disinterested commitment, have already been demonstrated. Women have raised more than one man to power.³⁵

Her words are consequential, signifying her passion and well-processed thoughts. Though Daouda listens as she speaks, Ramatoulaye remarks that, "I had the impression that more than my ideas, it was my voice that captivated him."³⁶ Her voice has been heard.

Ramatoulaye's significant and life-changing transformation into a woman who stands strong in her beliefs, follows her inner voice and learns from her past, is one that is comparable to many African women. The development of Ramatoulaye's inner voice and her examination of "*la vue de l'intérieur*" combine, creating an example for other African women, as Aissatou set an example for her friend. The power of introspection is clear in Ramatoulaye's personal battle against polygamy and oppression. Not only does she overcome the silence which has been socially forced upon her, but she defines a clear position on numerous social issues facing women during Senegal's development. From a distance, one may not notice this true inner revolution which she experiences during the forty days spent in mourning. These changes do not call attention to themselves. From the outside, they appear to be subtle or non-existent. The truth is there is empowerment within such transformations. By looking within themselves, women can overcome adversity, patriarchy and unjust systems. By working within their own societies, women can make small steps through personal decisions that, when combined, create an undercurrent of revolutionary ideas and mindsets. These are mindsets which allow women to discover hope in times of hopelessness, strength in the face of powerlessness, and a voice in the midst of silence.

ENDNOTES

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The Changing Roma Culture in Europe and Finland

JULIANNA BUTLER

I chose to go to Finland to study abroad to learn more about the Sami, the indigenous people of northern Lapland who are recognized worldwide for their reindeer herding and colorful dress. Finland proudly displays her Sami population to the world and domestically acknowledges their need for special laws protecting their land. I had no idea that there was another minority culture in Finland, larger than the Sami, yet virtually unknown or even mentioned in any guide or reference book. Commonly known as Gypsies, the Roma are Finland's third-largest minority, following only Swedish-speakers and Russian-speakers, yet do not receive the same benefits as the other minorities mentioned.

Finland's unique history of fighting for independence between two superpowers, Sweden and Russia, has created an understanding of the importance of retaining and protecting national identity. So then why are the Roma looked down upon and ignored by the majority of Finns, and unrecognized in research and informational books on Finland? I propose that the Roma's status in Finland is due to their history and culture. Since they first arrived in Europe, they have been

persecutde for their exotic nature, and they have survived only by remaining a closed community. Paradoxically, this isolation is now threatening their culture. The effects of globalization are far-reaching, and in our increasingly technological world, the Roma stand little chance of maintaining their culture without drastic adaptations. Already Roma have had to give up nomadism and traditional activities such as lace-making. If no protectionist measures are established, or if the Roma community stays as isolated as it is currently, they face the immediate danger of forced cultural adaptation to the point of cultural extinction. To understand this ongoing phenomenon, I must first share my experiences with Roma in Finland, and how I came to know their situation.

From September 2002 to April 2003, I studied abroad at Oulu Univerisity in Oulu, Finland. Henna Murtomäki, who explained her heritage as half Finnish, half Roma, came to guest lecture one of my classes. She taught us about the delicate situation Roma face in Finland and in Europe today, both as a culture and as individual communities. The Roma's condition is not an isolated one: their struggle for equality and survival is paralleled in every discriminated and persecuted ethnic group worldwide. The Roma have been living in and interacting with Europe and America for hundreds of years. Consequently, they have affected the cultures, languages, and lifestyles of all those with whom they live. It is therefore vital to understand more about the Roma in order to help save parts of our own culture, to learn more about our past, and to understand how we can help save other persecuted minorities.

It is important to note my choice of the term Roma instead of Gypsy in this work. The Roma as a people have been assigned various names throughout history in different geographical areas. Gypsy is a term applied to the Roma by outsiders, in the mistaken belief that Roma came from Egypt.¹ The Roma were also originally called *Tsigenare* in Greece, from the word *atsinganoi* meaning "not to be touched."² In Finland, the word for Roma is *mustalainen*, literally "of the black," implying very dark-skinned people. The correct term is Roma, from *Rom* meaning "mankind" in the language of the Roma people.³ To be

even more precise, Roma generally prefer to be called by their individual tribe names, instead of the cover-all term Roma. I chose to use "Roma" because I am examining Roma tribes in a holistic sense, and I only describe separate tribes when discussing Finnish tribes.

On a more personal note, previous to my fieldwork I had used the term Gypsy without second thought. I did not realize that the word Gypsy does not fairly represent Roma, and it perpetuates historical, exotic myths. It is commonly assumed, especially in North America and Europe, that Gypsy is the correct title. References in songs, TV shows, and other mediums all reinforce the romantic, exotic and sometimes dirty image of a "traditional Gypsy".

In order to understand where society created such stereotypes about Gypsies, we first have to learn about Roma history. Then we can start to recognize how the Roma fit into today's society and to delineate what can be done to stop the persecution and discrimination they face every day.

EUROPEAN ROMA

Although the largest non-territorial minority in Europe, Roma are continually oppressed, endangered, and marginalized due to lack of adequate representation. There are said to be anywhere from eight to fifteen million Roma living in Europe, making up over five percent of Europe's total population.⁴ Finding exact numbers on Roma population is an arduous task; tribes stretch across almost every western and eastern European country, from Norway to Portugal to Turkey and Slovakia. Governmental assimilation programs as well as intercultural marriages have confused traditional Roma community populations. Some Roma also remain nomadic and therefore have no permanent place of residence so are not counted among a country's population. In some countries, the laws are such that registering as a Roma essentially forfeits basic civil human rights and risks endangerment.

Not having an accurate count of Roma populations causes severe under-representation for the Roma. Under-representation is also caused by the nature of Roma communities. Roma live all across Europe in

relatively small communities. This means that there aren't large concentrations of Roma in any one area. So although their numbers overall are very large, they do not have enough voting members in any one area to properly elect Roma representatives to governmental office.

Under-representation for Roma populations has caused a multitude of problems throughout Europe. With no voice in government, Roma have been subject to programs and measures not designed for their way of living. Not only does this cost the government money, it alienates the Roma even further from their fellow countrymen. They feel persecuted for having a different culture, and they are blamed for wasting the government's money. The social stigma against them grows, affecting all aspects of their lives. Landlords refuse them apartments, employers refuse them jobs, and they are left with little economic choice. They often steal and beg to bring food to their families, thus reinforcing the stereotype of a "good for nothing" Roma. The violence then inflicted on Roma is a result of angry neighbors and citizens who feel the Roma culture is worthless and should be "taken care of."

These programs, assimilations, refusals, and frequent incidents of violence cause Roma communities to close themselves further from the outside world. What are the specific catalysts for withdrawing from the majority culture, and can the cycle be stopped? The Roma community refuses help because of pride and distrust of the majority outside community which has long persecuted Roma. Remaining in this cycle leads to more tensions and misunderstandings, and fewer opportunities for outside help. The Roma end up hurting their chance for survival. Establishing strong insider/outsider lines have kept them alive in the past, but times have changed. Globalization has created a closer world—one that also is threatening the traditional Roma way of life. The Roma now have to find a voice for themselves in order to survive. When they remain silent, programs and governments aren't properly tailored to fit their needs as a culture. Anthropologists, trained in preventing ethnocentrism, are ideal researchers in this area. If governments worked closely with researchers, they could devise feasible, practical programs that would benefit both Roma and

the state. It is therefore important to look to the work done by past anthropologists.

PAST RESEARCH

Recent anthropological fieldwork and research on the Roma is dominated by a few key individuals. While researching, I found that there have been many research projects completed in the past, but much of the work readily available was done before the 1960s. Anthropologists at this time were taught definitive inside/outside boundaries, so they often looked down upon the (outside) Roma culture as less civilized and primitive. Political scientists and economists also viewed the world in terms of "modern" (i.e. Western) and "primitive."⁵

When researching Finland's history, one will quickly discover the lack of information on the Roma. Even comprehensive books designed to give "some idea of what it is like to be a Finn in the modern world" make no mention of the third largest minority in Finland.⁶ With names like *A History of Finland* and *Finland in the Twentieth Century*, it should be expected that at least marginal respect be paid to the Roma, who have been living in Finland for centuries, helping shape Finland through the years.⁷ But neither of these books reference Roma or Gypsies in their index or contents, giving readers a false perception of Finland's history. Surprisingly, *A Short History of Finland* does include "Gypsies" in the index, with two pages referenced.⁸ Singleton remarks "treatment of...gypsies in the twentieth century has at times been characterized by obtuseness and by a willingness to subordinate the long-term interests of the downtrodden minority for the short-term interests of the majority."⁹ He also acknowledges that "tensions have been generated" due to the Roma being "ignored."¹⁰ Although Singleton's sentiments are correct, three paragraphs in one history book do not provide a thorough background or understanding of the Roma in Finland today.

When researchers adopted these neglectful or assumptive approaches, they tended to force their own cultural views on the Roma, making their studies ethnocentric. Predictions were even made that

“the power of civilization will by and by blot [Roma] people as a people from the earth.”¹¹ Many studies led to an even deeper rift between Roma and outside communities. Because of the initial misunderstanding of the Roma culture, more recent studies are therefore harder to complete. Roma issues have been quieted by many governments or are nonexistent in the public eye, and therefore funding for anthropological research of Roma is difficult to obtain.

Another major obstacle, besides overcoming cultural stereotypes, is finding a good Roma informant. Many Roma barely know how to speak the language of their native country. They have been banned from the educational systems of the state, and therefore do not have the ability to communicate easily with those outside their immediate village. Learning the Roma tongue is difficult for outsiders, and most governments don't provide any funding for Romani to be taught in schools to Roma children. Romani is the general term used to describe Roma language, even though the language varies from country to country and tribe to tribe. The European Rome Rights Center has encountered these problems in trying to provide an international source for all Roma and non-Roma.¹² It has ended up publishing its website in English, with the option of translating parts to Romani or German. All ERRC publications are also available in English, but when Roma are the target audience, the ERRC sends Romani written texts. To learn the Roma language even just in a specific area is also difficult due to the lack of written sources.

Roma rely on oral tradition, and most never learned to read or write, having been refused education or have dropped out at an early age. There are no written accounts on the Roma's travels from India; only songs and stories remain, which I will discuss further in the next section. The old literature that does mention Roma and their travels is written by the elite of the times, always a non-Roma, usually a white European male. This means any written history before the 1950's was not only inaccurate but prejudiced as well. Therefore, to gain access to a Roma informant, an anthropologist might have to live with the Roma for a significant period of time in order to gain a sufficient fluency in the language.

An accurate study of the Roma culture demands closeness, trust, and honesty between the informant and researcher. The Roma traditionally do not trust outsiders (which is hardly surprising) due to the manner in which they have been treated by outsiders in the past. Their communities stay close and do not allow outsiders access easily. Henna told me that in some cases when a Roma marries a non-Roma, the Roma family literally forgets them and erases them out of the Bible (where they mark down the names of the children after birth). This may be a hard concept to imagine, but the Roma have different concepts and values attached to family and outside society. There is a steadfast, almost unbreakable line between the insider and outsider groups. Even spending years among the people will not guarantee trust or information. Gaining the trust of a Roma community as a non-Roma could take decades, if indeed it could be done at all.

I am still overwhelmed by Henna's generosity with me, an outsider, in discussing her culture, even though her community elders disagree with her openness to such outsiders. Though I might have been "at the right place at the right time" in finding Henna, I acknowledge and respect the difficult task many anthropologists face when studying the Roma. A number of factors were in my favor when I gained Henna as an informant. Not only was she educated and fluent in English, she had extensive previous experience sharing her culture with others. Also, it is worth noting that while Henna did contribute many hours giving me facts and opinions on the Roma, I do not feel that I now fully understand any part of her Roma community. There are still many things she was hesitant to describe to me and topics we did not discuss at all.

The barriers of language and community are two main factors that explain why there isn't more known about the Roma. Another is the lack of formal education among the Roma—not just learning to read and write language (contributing to the language barrier) but general educational attainment. If more Roma were educated to at least a high-school level, perhaps awareness of them as a minority would spread. With an education, Roma could speak out for themselves and compete in the world on more equal terms. Yet educated Roma—like

Papusza, the poet in my opening poem—are rare individuals quickly shunned by outsiders and other Roma. Papusza was glorified for a brief moment, until her poems were published. Her community was shocked at the betrayal, shocked that she would write about their culture to outsiders.¹³ Educated Roma are not encouraged within the community or outside of it. Since education is often a rarity among their kind, Roma have come to fear the unknown and sometimes cast out their educated members, as demonstrated by Papusza's case. A lack of educated members that stay in the community translates into no voice for the Roma villages. Without any higher education, Roma cannot become doctors, teachers or anthropologists. By remaining a silent minority, Roma also find it nearly impossible have their rights championed by outsiders.

Not only lack of education keeps the Roma silent. In many cases, citizenship or voting laws keep Roma away from gaining representative power. Henna told me about the R's (for "Roma") that get stamped in passports of Roma from eastern European countries, assuming they can get a passport at all.

In many countries [Roma] don't even qualify [for a passport] because after the splitting of many countries, they pass such legislation that in order to get citizenship you should to be living in one address, at least one place, one village, one city, for five years, a minimum of five years. And many Roma still carry on their nomad professions, like scrap dealings, seasonal farm-work. They don't qualify for five years, or have permanent address, if they live in a caravan...so it's problematic. They also have some language conditions, speaking, things like that. Naturally of which citizenship they're applying for.¹⁴

In Finland, each county (there are two hundred) votes for a representative for Parliament. Henna explained Roma's situation as this:

There are about six thousand [Roma] or so to say, but regionally our election system works in a way that people in a certain region, area of a country, vote for their own representatives; and this makes

it tricky for the Roma because we are scattered all around the country, so we can't get our own representatives very easily."¹⁵

Without a concentration of community members in any one area, Roma can never elect themselves a Roma representative, even if there was an acceptable candidate. Henna wryly concluded, "So basically we need to find a non-Roma representative that will care for Roma issues, but it's not one of the most popular election themes." Then she laughed.¹⁶ Henna may be able to apply her naturally good sense of humor to this situation, but humor does not diminish the severity of this problem.

Finland has in recent years taken more notice of Roma rights (perhaps due to increased attention by the European Union on minority treatment), but awareness does not undo all the damage the government has inflicted. "Actually passing laws against discrimination in [Finland], that didn't happen very early. It was only 1970s that we got laws against racial discrimination...wasn't 'til 1980 that we got Romani language to the law, so to say, acknowledged."¹⁷

Language barriers, restricted communities, educational deficiencies, and governmental policies can all work against Roma progress toward finding a voice in the world today. Yet despite overwhelming odds, some Roma are able to create a voice for themselves. This can be done in many ways, such as by educated Roma (such as anthropologist Ian Hancock), Roma based groups (like the EERC), non-Roma allowed into a Roma community (such as Sharon Gmelch and Isabel Fonseca), or non-Roma who simply think them a remarkable minority whose story deserves justice (such as Angus Fraser).

ROMA HISTORY

Roma history, like the people, is ambiguous. Defining the Roma's original journey from India into Europe is an arduous and complicated task that continues to puzzle anthropologists, historians, and archaeologists. There are many obstacles for any scholar retracing

the Roma's route from the East. Past literary references to the Roma are not always clear on what ethnic group they were describing. This confusion arises partly because the Roma became "known under a variety of local names" in different regions.¹⁸ Even the commonly assigned name, Gypsy, implies Egyptian origin—a theory which has only been corrected in the past century. The ambiguity has led to many different opinions on the exact paths and times the Roma may have taken when leaving India.

As I briefly mentioned before, the Roma are not, and have never been, a literary culture. Any written source of their travels was written by the few elite literates of the time, and therefore always non-Roma. Roma's main method of recording and storing information is in songs, stories and word-of-mouth, leaving behind no written trail we can follow. Instead, we try to assemble together their true movements through linguistics, modern genetic science, sparse literary references, and oral stories passed down from generation to generation in Roma communities. I look at Roma history as a puzzle with pieces missing. We now have a good understanding of where Roma came from, what lands they crossed, and where they stayed, but new findings keep reshaping the puzzle.

When Angus Fraser wrote a book, *The Gypsies*, for a series entitled "Peoples of Europe," (other cultures in this series include *The Bretons*, *The Huns*, *The Etruscans*, and *The Norsemen in the Viking Age*) many people, according to Fraser, were conflicted over his choice; they disagreed that the Roma should be labeled as "European."¹⁹ While he agrees that the Roma did not originate in Europe and that they emigrated from India, he argues that the Roma deserve their European title because they have been living in Europe for the past thousand years. They were at one point an essential building block to modern day Europe, and their culture has adapted many European ways. He states that their "changing identity [was] inevitable...their ethnicity was to be fashioned and remolded by a multitude of influences, internal and external. They would assimilate innumerable elements which had nothing to do with India, and they would eventually cease to be, in any meaningful way, Indians."²⁰ It is remarkable to me

that some people find such offense just by including Roma under the category "European." I feel that this is partly due to a lack of, or erroneous knowledge of, the Roma history, and flawed knowledge about the Roma culture in general.

I include Roma's history in my work because we cannot understand the Roma of today without looking first at the Roma of the past. Kenrick and Puxon also discovered this while trying to write their book *The Destiny of Europe's Gypsies*. They stated that the book was originally meant to recount only the Nazi persecution, but they soon realized the event couldn't be viewed in isolation, and so they covered Roma history as well.²¹ We have to understand that the Roma were at first welcomed into Europe. They then became forced slaves and, later in the twentieth century, a hunted ethnic group—all the while having various governmental assimilation projects chasing them. To understand the Roma's position in today's changing world, there must first be an account of the main stages in Roma history: their initial welcome, their decline into slavery, Nazi persecution and ethnic genocide, and finally "civilized" governmental programs designed to integrate Roma into society. All of these past actions have shaped the Roma culture of today.

Departure from India

The Roma left their native land of India sometime between 800 A.D. 950 A.D. Perhaps they were forced to leave as prisoners of war, captive entertainers, or simply as a marginalized people with nowhere else to go. Or perhaps they were just part of some Sudra caste Indians who, having traveled to Iran, couldn't find their way back into India again—a theory that neatly combines all the above hypotheses into a simple explanation.²² But in reality, there is no hard evidence for the reason or cause behind this mass movement out of India. There is also no hard evidence dictating whether only one group emigrated at one time or if multiple groups left at different times.

There has been linguistic evidence to support both theories. The first camp suggests that the ancestors of all Gypsy populations (re-

ferred to as Domba) left at the same time and spoke a single proto-Gypsy language, Dombari. The language then split into two branches as the Roma traveled and separated: Eastern Gypsy (Domari) and a Central and Western Gypsy (Lomavren and Romani, respectively). A different aspect of linguistic evidence supports the other theory, suggesting three different emigration periods and groups. Among all three main branches of the Romani language, no roots are shared; one would expect at least some words to carry over if members of the same culture passed through the same areas. Also, one branch retains a trace of a third grammatical gender absent in the others.²³ This would mean the different groups encountered different influences to their language, and so it wasn't simply one large group at first. Analyzing linguistics is one of the best methods we have in tracing the Roma movements, but "linguistic deductions are hampered by the fact that...it is difficult to assess the pace of the widespread linguistic restructuring which was probably taking place while the Gypsies were in Persia."²⁴ Suffice to say, speculation must continue on these differences in theory.

Fraser warns of the danger in oversimplifying linguistic evidence.²⁵ In the process of imagining the "successive 'splits' in language and separations into different 'bands' [we] risk creating an unconscious image of the Gypsy migration as consisting of hordes of people trooping out of India and, at certain points along their route, neatly breaking into two subdivisions each of which proceeds on its divergent but generally westward way."²⁶ The Roma have already been misunderstood culturally, so before we accept any theory as fact we need to realize that the research is still incomplete. We can only say for sure that sometime between the third and tenth centuries a large number of Indians left their homeland and became the Roma we see today.

After leaving northern India, the proto-Roma traveled westward. Unfortunately, there are no contemporary accounts of the first Roma to reach the Middle East, but writings and legends from the tenth century have been translated describing the Roma's arrival some five centuries earlier.²⁷ One legend even gives a reason behind the Roma's eventual nomadic lifestyle:

The Persian monarch had decided his subjects should spend half of all their days eating and drinking to the sound of music, but unfortunately he did not have enough musicians. He persuaded the king of India to send him twelve thousand musicians. They were distributed throughout the Persian kingdom, along with the cattle, wheat, and asses they were given. A year went by, and the musicians came back hungry. The king reproached them, saying, "Was it not your task to plough, to sow and reap? Your asses still remain. Load them up, prepare your harps and stretch the silken cords." And so the "Gypsies" went sent to their fate, travelers living by their wits.²⁸

Such legends exist also among the Roma themselves. While teaching our class, Henna showed us a video authored by a Roma woman about a legend that supplied a reason for the Gypsies constant wandering. The video was simple but very artistic animation with an interesting string soundtrack.

It tells of a musical family who were in dire straights after spending their days traveling in the hot desert. They came upon a kingdom but were denied entrance (and therefore life-saving water and shade) by the guards. A week goes by, and the family starts playing their instruments to fight off depression and bad spirits. The king hears their music and rushes out to invite them in. They live with the king happily for many years, receiving many gifts from him, including a beautiful mirror. The king eventually succumbs to illness and dies. Then the guards (who have been planning their revenge) throw the family out again, but not before breaking everything of value they own, including the mirror. The family vow to recover all the pieces, which have been scattered a large distance on the wind, to honor the king who was so generous to them.²⁹

Watching this video made me think about the need the Roma must have for a past. I see an obvious tendency of Roma and non-Roma adopting illogical legends just to fill the factual void in Roma history. This is a demonstration of how desperate this culture is for a background of any kind. "They had no promised land as a focus of their dreams and would themselves, in time, forget their Indian antecedents

and indeed, show little interest in their early history, leaving it to the [non Roma], centuries later, to rediscover and pursue obsessively their past and their lineage.”³⁰ In any case, it is clear that the history of the “comparatively short time” between the departure from India and arrival in Europe is again mostly one of pure speculation—and one in need of conclusive research.³¹

The Initial Welcome into Europe

The Roma’s arrival in Europe occurred sometime after A.D. 1100.³² Kenrick puts their arrival in Eastern Europe via their Asia Minor route in the early fourteenth century. There is even a reference recorded in Crete in 1322 of the “nomadic Gypsies...stopping only thirty days in one place.” A document was also found recording sedentary Roma in the Balkans as early as 1378. A hundred years later, a supposed three hundred Roma families were settled in permanent houses in Greece, making a living through shoemaking and metalwork.³³

The first recording of Roma language was much later in coming, waiting until 1547 to make an appearance in England as a sample of “Egipt speche.”³⁴ It is important we understand that although many of these late references seem to match typical Roma stereotypes of the time, we shouldn’t be too hasty in assigning incorrect identities. “Too often the assumption has been made, in looking for traces if the Gypsies, that any reference to a migrant group pursuing a Gypsy-like occupation can for that reason be equated with them.”³⁵

We don’t know much about the “social organization and culture of the early Gypsies...but can conjecture” based on two assumptions. Roma would have retained and reflected “an Indian model of existence,” and they would have shown “the special characteristics which can be observed in many peripatetic groups.”³⁶ An example of this would be sub-castes based on specialization of work. “The monoprofessional character of a[n ethnic sub-caste] leads to economic interdependence; it may also give rise to constant territorial movement or dispersal, in order to find enough demand for the skills in question, and it is not difficult to find analogies with the Gypsies among the

peripatetic groups which are particularly profuse in the Indian sub-continent.”³⁷ Using Fraser’s assumptions, I was able to also identify similar characteristics of the Finnish Roma and their ancient Indian heritage. Indian society dictates a “fairly rigid purity and pollution ideology” which explains the Finnish Roma’s strict rules regarding cleanliness.³⁸ The body is divided into two main parts, the clean upper half and the dirty lower half. Any food stored below waist level automatically becomes inedible, and shirts must be washed in different water than the skirts, lest they become irreversibly polluted.³⁹

The early Roma’s nomadic way of life would not have been seen as too unusual to others in Europe at the time of their arrival: “In Iran and neighboring lands nomadism was widespread.” But the reasons behind the movements of Roma and other nomads were quite different. Generally, nomads were people who moved for agricultural or pastoral reasons, but the Roma moved in order to sell their goods or perform their trades.⁴⁰ “At first, the virtual absence of a working class made welcome the skills which the Gypsies brought with them from Byzantium and beyond.”⁴¹ “It seems probable that many in the original groups filled an economic niche by the provision of specialized goods or services, working in relatively small numbers and keeping on the move, since they could not afford to swamp the market and needed a wide range of customers.”⁴²

Persecution and Slavery

The Roma’s special niche in European economy and culture did not prevent them from becoming forced slaves. As industry grew, it “may be estimated that well over half the entire Roma population of Europe at the time were subjugated, and thus became the mainstay of the economy which oppressed them.”⁴³ Not only were the Roma forced to endure the hardships of slavery, they have continuously been denied the acknowledgement of any such slave arrangement at all. Although not widely known, Roma were forced into slavery, presumably due to their dark skin and non-European culture. “Despite these facts, Gypsy presence isn’t acknowledged in a single treaty of Atlantic

slave trade," and countries, like Romania, deliberately suppress any such information.⁴⁴ There is a Roma saying, "Kon mangel te kerel tumendar oburen i šoxa phenela tumen o a imos pa tumare perintonde ," translated as "he who wants you to enslave you will never tell you of your forefathers."⁴⁵ Moore agrees and phrases this another way: "[I]n any society the dominant groups are the ones with the most to hide about the way society works."⁴⁶ So "only cursory acknowledgements of the five centuries of slavery endured by the Gypsies has yet been made," and no detailed research at all has appeared in English.⁴⁷

The first mention, in 1366, of Gypsies in Romanian archives looks like a reference to cattle. In 1385, Prince Dan I received a gift of forty Gypsy families, and in 1388 three hundred Roma families were donated to a monastery.⁴⁸ "In September 1445 Prince Vlad Dracul (Vlad the Devil) captured from Bulgaria some twelve thousand persons 'who looked like Egyptians'...thus he became the first wholesale importer of Gypsies as slaves."⁴⁹ The next recorded batch was the booty of Stefan the Great (for his crusades against the Turks), who transported more than seventeen thousand Roma and for this was recorded in the epic poem *Tiganiada* as a national hero.⁵⁰ This time of Dracula (1431–1476) preceded full-blown slavery in Romania, but it set the groundwork for later mass forced slavery of the Roma.

Slavery continued in Romania until 1856; and when this was stopped, "ex-owners of slaves were compensated 96 francs per slave at abolition, [but] nothing came from the Romanian government for the slaves themselves, no orientation programs, no assistance with health care or housing."⁵¹ "Gypsies were left to fend for themselves in a hostile environment, totally unequipped to deal with the anti-Gypsy laws in effect everywhere throughout Europe."⁵² This situation can be equated to what happened in the developing world after colonizers left. A "crisis of colonialism" occurred when independence was thrust upon colonized nations before they had an adequate democratic structure.⁵³ The developing world is still trying to climb out of the cycle of dependence the colonizers left in their wake. Similarly, the Roma are still trying to climb out of the low socio-economic roles left for them by their enslavers.

The Hidden Holocaust

When the world came into the twentieth century, the Roma were still an oppressed minority. They would become the number two victims in the Holocaust but be denied any claim to reparations. The “chain of persecution and harassment [that led into the Holocaust was] based upon prejudices deep rooted in European society.”⁵⁴ “Although [Roma had resided] in Central Europe for centuries, and had become citizens, the public continued to consider them [an] alien race.”⁵⁵ The perspective of the general populace helped the elite Nazi Party continue persecution—only on a new level of genocide. “Even before the Nazis came to power, German politicians and scientists deplored the presence of colored hybrids on German soil.”⁵⁶ The Holocaust was, in a way, a culmination of intolerance from decades and centuries before. Not much information is available on the fate of the Gypsies in the Holocaust, and only one full-length book in English has been published.⁵⁷ In Himmler’s “Circular of December 8, 1938,” he states that “the proper method of attacking the Gypsy problem seems to be to treat it as a matter of race.”⁵⁸ He repeatedly uses words like “Gypsy nuisance,” “vagrants,” and “Gypsy criminality”; and Germany had even set up an official office, the Reich Criminal Office for Combating the Gypsy Nuisance, specifically for this “problem.”⁵⁹ Roma were described as “hereditary diseased, social deviants, [and were] involuntarily sterilized.”⁶⁰

Yet what shocks me the most is that despite the mass murdering of Jews and Roma alike, only the Jews have been recognized as victims. If you visit a concentration camp in Poland or Germany, you will find that the “Gypsy presence in barracks is absent.”⁶¹ There were never any Roma invited to join the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Council, which honors all those who perished—despite their having lobbied for this privilege for three years.⁶² In the same way, “Gypsies were given no help after the war, none were called to testify at the Nuremberg Trials or any crime hearings, and no reparation has ever come”⁶³ “In many ways, little has changed since the end of the Second World War; the persecutions continue, but are simply not centralized in the

same way.”⁶⁴ Indeed, the Roma have not only had to deal with such large issues like genocide, but they daily face persecution and abuse from outsiders and governments.

HENNA MURTOMÄKI

In discussing the role of Roma today, an inside perspective is needed. I was lucky enough to have found Henna Murtomäki. She is a half Roma and half Finn, split between these two cultures her entire life. She works inside and outside of the Roma community in Finland as an educator, teaching basics to elementary school children and multiculturalism to university students. She is the first person to create a Finnish Romani language book designed to educate Roma children in their own language. She gives lectures on Roma life to non-Roma and takes time to discuss the finer points of Roma culture with many different people. She brings the Finnish and Roma worlds together and presents another way of viewing the Roma just by being herself.

When Henna walks into a room, you first notice that she is a short woman, about five foot or less. She has dark curly hair, almost down to her elbows. Her skin is slightly olive, a shade darker than most Finns. She dresses conservatively, yet femininely, with nice dress slacks and a long-sleeved blouse or a tee shirt she covers with a pretty shawl. She has a very round face and dark eyes that twinkle at you cheerfully, constantly—except when she talks about her Roma family or the situation of Roma throughout Europe. Then her eyes change from cheerful to intensely passionate. She contains so much energy in her body; it was amazing to watch her talk or give a lesson. She gestures with her hands while she talks, and she’s very personable. And at the time I knew her, Henna was also noticeably pregnant. About a week before I left Finland, she gave birth to a healthy baby girl. While teaching our course, she was about eight months pregnant along, so her pregnancy affected our lessons with her. Teaching us about the Roma also brought to the front of her mind the difficulties she would experience raising a part Roma child in a still largely Roma-ignorant society.

When I met her, I noticed her physical appearance but not as a significant characteristic of who she was. In fact, her appearance has shaped her life in ways I didn't expect. Her dark hair and eyes and olive skin have been her friend and enemy, helping and hurting her in life. Within her Roma community, dark curly hair, dark eyes, dark skin are traditional physical features and well-regarded. In traditional Finnish society, however, her darker complexion sets her apart from the majority of the population, and people are more suspect of her. She often gets asked if she is a Roma, merely based on her physical characteristics. She even went through a time in her life when she straightened her hair to hide her Roma feature from her friends. Nowadays Henna walks down the street with pride in her curly hair, but she had to do some major soul-searching in order to find peace with her heritage.

"You [Roma are] all the same, it makes no difference"

She described to me that as a little girl, she would feel singled out by shopkeepers because of her ethnic difference. She would go to buy sweets with a group of friends and she would be pulled aside so that the proprietor could make sure she wasn't stealing. She was only five or six years old at the time, and none of the other children got the same treatment. In fact, she explained to me that she understood what was happening at the time, and although she felt "humiliated," she understood why this was happening. The Finnish stereotype Roma as thieves or beggars, and shopkeepers often search Roma with no justified cause. Henna was able to stop one such instance when she was older and happened to see two young Roma girls (from Roma families in her community) getting pulled off to the side by the department store security guards. She "saw them getting pulled aside and [she] got interested and actually followed [them] upstairs where they have the place where they can check them."⁶⁵ She was able to listen covertly to the conversation between the guards and the girls, and her suspicions rose. The guards then told the girls "Take off your clothes," which is quite illegal in Finland.⁶⁶ This type of physical

search requires reasonable cause, and only female guards can be in attendance. Neither condition was fulfilled in this case. Henna stepped in and told the guards they had no right to perform a search, and they let the girls go. Henna was afraid the girls were humiliated, but their reaction was only "this is just normal." Henna did not find this kind of treatment acceptable.

Henna wasn't only singled out as a little child; she has been persistently persecuted for her looks and assumed culture. She described another incident, a hate crime, while in class and later in more detail in an interview. As a teenager, she had been in a choir, traveling across Europe to sing. One night, while relaxing in a club in Germany with other singing groups, some skinheads burst into the club and attacked her and the Jewish girls dancing nearby. They swung her around on the floor of the club, shouting "Jude Schwein" ("Jewish Pig"). She had just started to learn German, and was able to say "Ich bin kein Jude Schwein, ich bin ein Roma" ("I am not a Jewish pig, I'm Roma"). The skinhead answered, "You're all the same; it makes no difference." While telling this story, Henna's voice wavered, and we could tell she was recalling a sensitive memory. To end the story she simply said, "and because once again I was picked from a crowd, only because of the way I looked."⁶⁷

All of these incidents influenced Henna's decision not to wear the traditional Roma costume. The traditional Finnish Roma costume is an elaborate dress, a significant marker in the Roma history and culture. Wearing the costume brings with it great responsibility because it "is a sign of now [she is] an independent member of this community [and has] specific rights and duties. It is a coming of age ritual that the Roma have practiced for centuries. Once you start wearing it, you are forbidden to stop. A woman can decide not to wear the dress, like Henna did, and later in life change her mind and start wearing it. Yet a woman can never start wearing the dress and then decide to stop, except in the case of "serious health problems."

The costume consists of a long, foot-length black velvet skirt and a long-sleeved lace blouse. The velvet can weigh up to ten to fifteen pounds; the shirt can take months to sew; the whole outfit can exceed five thousand dollars. The Finnish government does provide

some help in this matter, since most Roma would be unable to pay such amounts for their costume. However, the government does not provide enough funding for all—and not nearly enough for other programs designed to help break the destructive cycle of unemployment, miseducation, and other problems facing Roma.

This economical pressure may be endangering the traditional costume to the point of extinction. Social pressures are at work as well, and partly due to the outside negative social stigma attached to the costume, many young women are choosing not to don the garments.

Dress is not the only element of Roma culture in danger; there are numerous traditions phasing out of communities due to technology and globalization. For example, many Roma in Finland lack the funds needed to build their own homes. Unfortunately, most apartments and houses in Finland are not compatible with Roma traditions of cleanliness. Roma believe that anything below the waist is “dirty” and above the waist “clean.” A utensil placed on a stool is therefore dirty, but placed on the counter, it is clean. In practice, this means food must always be kept above waist level; but in Finland, refrigerators are placed on the floor, creating a unique problem for the Roma.

Henna acknowledges the difficult decisions the Roma have to make in today’s world. “We don’t have any options really. We have to integrate. We have to live.”⁶⁸ I wondered how it makes her feel to know that the Roma have to analyze their own culture to make sure certain aspects will remain, while others disappear. “Well I think it’s sad to say ‘this will disappear’. It’s only natural that this would disappear, but I can also see Roma culture taking new forms”⁶⁹ Her solution and prediction is that Roma “need to stress the most important things” they want to keep, and focus on those. She takes an optimistic yet harshly realistic point of view. It is the Roma way of surviving.

AMERICAN VS. EUROPEAN “GYPSY” STEREOTYPES

Earlier I alluded to a difference between American and European Roma stereotypes. As an American, I had previously only heard of Roma as Gypsies. In America, a Gypsy is typically romantic, musi-

cally talented, and/or dirty. These ideas are reinforced through TV, movies, songs, and other forms of popular media. For example, I've chosen three songs from U.S. musical artists, all containing false but popular images of the typical Gypsy.

The Ramones, one of the most widely known punk rock bands of the 1980s, made a song, "I Wanna Live," containing these lyrics: "I just can't trust myself/I'm a Gypsy prince/Covered in diamonds and jewels/And then my lover exposes me/And I know I'm just a damn fool...As I lowered my pistol/Of fine German steel." In less than three minutes, the band has conveyed not only a romantic Gypsy ("my lover exposes me"), but also a carefree rich Gypsy ("diamonds and jewels"), a not-so-intelligent Gypsy ("a damn fool") and finally a violent Gypsy ("my pistol"). Yet the song is upbeat, and the image formed while listening is not negative. At worst it portrays Gypsies as desperate, but overall thrill and excitement of Gypsy life.

The Doors, a world-wide phenomenon of the 1970s, remade and popularized a song about the Roma titled "Spanish Caravan." Though the word Gypsies is never used, it is implied by the phrase "Spanish Caravan," since Roma are infamous for being nomadic travelers. "Trade winds find Galleons lost in the sea/I know where treasure is waiting for me/Silver and gold in the mountains of Spain/I have to see you again and again/Take me Spanish Caravan." The Doors' song creates an image of treasure-laden travelers, wandering the world in search of more treasure and the beauty of Spain.

Bruce Dickinson, also a famous American musical artist, wrote a song titled "Gypsy Road:" "Living by my own rules/A rebel yell and a rebel creed/Keep your life simple/Try not to take what you don't need.../Gypsy Road is the highway I run to/Gypsy Road welcome to your dreams." Dickinson constructs a Gypsy who is a rebel leading a simple but desirable life in which dreams can be achieved.

There are many other references to Gypsies outside of the music industry, including a Broadway show titled simply "Gypsy," a genre of music called "Gypsy Jazz," clothing stores using names like "Gypsy Moon." You can even learn how to "Gypsy dance"! Just typing in "Gypsy" on a popular search engine like Google will provide innu-

merable sites containing clothes, dance, music, and shows all about Gypsies. Nothing is overtly negative, and all of it is based on common misperceptions that Americans share about what a Gypsy really is.

Yet despite our naïve ignorance of the Roma, Americans have adopted “Gypsies” even into the English language. “Gyp,” a word used in everyday conversations, is a shortening of the word Gypsy. Gyp is defined in the American Heritage Dictionary as “to deprive (another) of something by fraud; cheat or swindle. [Probably short for Gypsy].”⁷⁰ While we may not explicitly know that “getting gypped” is a negative reference to Roma, the linguistic similarity leads us to associate Roma with thieves and swindlers. The definition of “Gypsy” in the same dictionary doesn’t offer any redeeming quality for Roma, “one inclined to a nomadic, unconventional way of life.”⁷¹ What can be implied from the word “unconventional”? Perhaps wild, rebellious Roma wandering the streets stealing money? Language is an awkward medium that can easily convey misconceptions and perpetuate mistaken definitions. Americans may never be fully aware of the insinuations of the term “gypped” or the songs about Gypsies. European stereotypes, on the other hand, are more direct in their insults of the Roma people.

I had the opportunity to hear many different European points of view on the Roma while in Finland. Many times I was shocked and angered at what I heard. As an American, I had never realized that Gypsies were so vehemently hated. One friend of mine described Roma as “parasites...taking all that they want, all they need, and don’t pay, and try to sell all that is possible, live outside the city, like a tribe...you can expect nothing good from them.”⁷² Another said, “they want to show off that they’re rich, but they’re really not,” and described how irritated she gets when dealing with Roma: “you get really angry and its not like you’re racist...you get angry at how they behave [because] they don’t even try to learn.”⁷³ It became apparent exactly how despised Roma are in Europe when my fellow students put down Henna, our half-Roma teacher, in class. Another American and I discussed the class later; we were both disgusted with our “friends.” We had no idea that our European classmates held such intensely negative views of the Roma.

Although I observed many overt insults and outright negativity by Europeans, another form of behavior, the telling of jokes, also conveys anxiety towards Roma. Joking around is not only a form of entertainment, it is often used by groups to distinguish "moral boundaries" and "acceptable behavior." "By making fun of periphery and ambiguous groups, they reduce ambiguity and clarify boundaries or at least make ambiguity appear less threatening."⁷⁴ "The marginalization and exclusion of an ethnic or regional minority may take the form of cultural discrimination, by stereotyping the cultural group as backward, uncivilized, unreliable, inferior or dangerous."⁷⁵ Finland is no exception to such joking:

A gypsy in a sauna ordered cold water to be thrown on the stones so that it wouldn't be so hot.

A gypsy was given a 120-year jail sentence. When asked how he felt about it, he said, "I'm very relieved I didn't get life imprisonment."⁷⁶

The Roma suffer doubly in Finnish and European society because they live on the peripherals of society, and they are often geographical, cultural, and behavioral targets in jokes.⁷⁷ Henna mentioned this tendency when describing an incident with a close friend of hers. A friend got up to leave the café table, and her other friend made a comment about her "leaving as fast as a Gypsy," implying Roma have a reason to run fast from others due to a thieving nature. Unfortunately, claims in ethnic jokes "can easily become self-fulfilling prophecies."⁷⁸ Jokes about the Roma based on stereotypes perpetuated in Europe and Finland are merely another kind of discrimination that the Roma face in trying to survive.

CONCLUSION

After all my research and my discussions with Henna, I still feel as if I am at the tip of the iceberg. There is still so much about Roma culture that I do not know and probably will not ever know, due to

their guarded nature with outsiders. I have found, however, that the Roma are an important but previously ignored culture which needs to be taken into consideration by governments. And yet, I cannot say what course of action would be best. It's a difficult decision for me or for anyone outside the Roma culture to make: Is a Western education the necessary and viable solution? If education is forced on unwilling Roma children and families, is this any better than past assimilation programs? Will the Roma react in the same way, by shutting off outside communication and influence even more? At this point in time, the Roma and the governments administering the programs need more information.

The government must provide Roma with normal education, not "retarded" classes that stunt opportunities later in life. Educate the Roma family on the choices available to them and the consequences of those choices. A revolutionary new education program started by independent principals of schools within Finland has had astounding results. By simultaneously re-educating Roma parents and providing normal educational classes for their children with specially trained teachers, test scores have rocketed skyward and attendance has maintained steady rates. This is, however, an isolated program and not state-supported. Until there is a state-wide inclusion of Roma needs into the curricula, Roma children will continue to forgo education. I believe that education can be the stepping stone to breaking the destructive cycle in which Roma find themselves, but it is not a complete solution.

Better world, history and cultural education for all grade school students, regular classroom interaction between Roma and non-Roma children, and stricter laws governing hate crimes against Roma would benefit the Roma and their European neighbors. Much action is needed on both a state and community level. If nothing else, it must be recognized that the Roma have not caused the problems that face them today. They must be recognized rightfully as victims of the Holocaust and of slavery and persecution. Only a combination of actions taken by the Roma and by their governments will start the process of healing. Holistic approaches using anthropological findings can take into consideration Roma and non-Roma culture and beliefs.

This would create working policies that won't further alienate the Roma, and will halt false prejudices about the Roma. The Roma are a culture valuable to the world, and this should be recognized by their governments. With effort, it is possible for the Roma to reclaim their history, represent themselves in every nation they live in, and become appreciated citizens of Europe.

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